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EUROPE RESPONDS TO THE CHALLENGE
OF THE NEW INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES: A
TELEINFORMATICS STRATEGY
FOR THE 1980's
Thomas . Ramseyt
In November 1979, the Commission of the European
Communities (the Commission) proposed that the Member States of
the European Communities (EC) secure one-third of the world
market in teleinformatics, a market including telecommunications,
computers, and related goods and services.' The message is clear:
the EC lags far behind the United States and Japan in this field and
it wants to catch up. The Commission's goal is to increase the
European share of the teleinformatics market by the end of the
1980's.
The Commission's plan is an effort to fill in gaps left by
programs and measuies of the EC institutions themselves, the
Member States, private companies, and other international
organizations. These programs and measures have included trans-
border data flow and privacy protection laws2 and telecomm-
t Attorney Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. B.A.
1967, Miami University;, J.D. 1972, Ohio State University College of Law; Graduate
Diploma 1975, Europa Institute, University of Amsterdam. The views expressed herein
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of
State.
1. The Commission's views and recommendations are contained in Commission of
the European Communities, European Society Faced With the Challenge of New
Information Technologies, Doc. COM (79) 650 final (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dublin
Report]. The Dublin Report was prepared upon the recommendation of Commissioner
Etienne Davignon, and was submitted to the Heads of State and Government on
November 29-30, 1979. As employed in the Dublin Report and in this Article, the term
"new technologies" encompasses the vast complex of communications and information
industries. Id summary 1-2. This Article will refer to the EC strategy as the
"teleinformatics strategy." The term "teleinformatics" is derived from "telematic," a
term intended by the EC to apply to all those services, systems, equipment, and products
that are based on the use of electronic information techniques, including
telecommunications, computers, advanced components and micro-processors, and data
banks. Id at 4.
2. See notes 36-49 infra and accompanying text.
238 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURA4L [Vol. 14:237
unications policies, as well as policy initiatives in such areas as
informatics, data processing, microelectronics, and social problems
of the new technologies. A review of EC studies and actions in these
areas demonstrates that the Brussels-based Eurocrats have examined
this complex field in the context of the objectives set forth in the
Treaty of Rome.3
This Article begins with a discussion of the basic problems
confronting the EC in the teleinformatics field. Next, the Article
discusses the recently proposed EC strategy that is designed to
address such problems and outlines the legal bases for the strategy's
three main aims: preparing society for the new technologies,
establishing a homogenous EC market in teleinformatic goods and
services, and creating new markets and strengthening the EC's
industrial capacity to meet the challenges of the new technologies.
Finally, the Article develops an analysis of the EC strategy and
suggests that in light of Treaty of Rome objectives, the EC
institutions have far from exhausted their authority under the
Treaty.
3. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. An
authoritative English translation appears in [1973] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, Part II (Cmd.
5179 II), at 1.
The European Communities operate through four institutions: the Council, the
Commission, the Assembly, and the Court of Justice. For the purposes of this Article,
these institutions will be discussed in the context of their responsibilities under the Treaty
of Rome.
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome gives the Council and Commission the authority to
"make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or give
opinions:' Treaty of Rome, supra, art. 189.
A regulation has general application, "is binding in its entirety and directly applicable
in all Member States." P. MATnusEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 183
(1972). Regulations are the most important source of secondary EC legislation. Id at
184. The "directly applicable" aspect of a regulation means that it creates rights and
obligations not only for Member States, but also for their citizens. Id
A directive is binding "as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is directed." Treaty of Rome, supra, art. 189. Directives are distinguishable
from regulations in that directives are binding only as to the result to be achieved and
pertain only to the addressee. A directive may or may not confer rights on private
persons, depending on its nature and intent.
A decision is "binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed." Id art. 189.
"The addressee can be a Member State or a legal or natural person and decisions can be
taken by the Council and by the Commission." P. MATHJSEN, spra, at 186. Decisions
are generally administrative decisions that implement EC law. Id
Recommendations and opinions "shall have no binding force." Treaty of Rome,
supra, art. 189. Recommendations "aim at obtaining a certain action or behavior from
the addressee while 'opinions' express a point of view at the request of a third party." P.
MATHUSEN, supra, at 187. However, the distinction between recommendations and
opinions is not legally significant. Id
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I
THE DILEMMA: JUSTIFICATION FOR A
UNIFIED COMMUNITY STRATEGY
The European post-war economic boom has slowed since 1974,
and Europe's overall economic position in the world has begun to
decline.4 In 1978, European heads of state recognized the need to
find new sources of growth to offset the decline in traditional indus-
tries such as steel, textiles, shipbuilding, and coal.5 These leaders
voiced the view that the evolving information industries offer a pri-
mary source of economic growth and social development. The Com-
mission was to study the matter and report back. The resulting
Commission Report analyzed the European teleinformatics situation
and proposed actions that the EC should take in response.6
The current EC position in the area of teleinformatics leaves
much to be desired. Although European industry has made substan-
tial intellectual contributions to the new technologies, the United
States and Japan are clearly the leaders in the commercial and
industrial fields.7 For example, Europe supplies only sixteen percent
of the world market in computers, whereas the United States sup-
plies over seventy percent." In the key peri-informatic area,
Europe's share of the market has fallen from one-third in 1973 to
one-quarter in 1978.9
Unlike the United States10 and Japan,"1 the EC is characterized
4. Dublin Report, supra note 1, foreward I. The Commission stated that "[a] con-
siderable effort will have to be made for the Community, its citizens, its cumbersome
social structures and its fragile political balances to react in a positive way by adapting to
the new economic and political realities of the world today." Id
5. Id summary I.
6. See Commission of the European Communities, New Information Technologies:
First Commission Report, Doc. COM (80) 513 final (1980) [hereinafter cited as First
Commission Report]. The First Commission Report generally follows the lines of action
originally proposed in the Dublin Report, note I supra.
7. Dublin Report, supra note 1, summary 3.
8. Id
9. Id
10. American success in the teleinformatics industry is seen as a function of a vast
home market, in part due to massive orders by the federal government, publicaly sup-
ported research and development programs, and uniform and inexpensive telecommuni-
cations networks. American industry, according to the Commission, has combined these
advantages with business initiative and technological innovations to achieve world domi-
nance. Id at 7-8.
11. The Commission paid particular attention to the Japanese "Plan for the Informa-
tion Society" introduced in 1967. In this plan the Japanese government, in cooperation
with private enterprises, established programs of research, development, and education
to transform its labor/energy/materials intensive industries into information intensive
industries. The Japanese strategy in the teleinformatics industry is similar to the strategy
Japan employed to gain major shares of the world's steel, motor vehicle, and consumer
electronics market. The Japanese government is "preparing to gain an increasing foot-
hold on the world market [in teleinformatics] by ensuring both that the products offered
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by a number of diverse and divisive national strategies. A purely
national and uncoordinated approach will not suffice to bring Euro-
pean enterprises into a competitive world position. Such programs
fail to permit exploitation of the EC's continental scale. Moreover,
the EC suffers because of differing standards, practices, and proce-
dures in various teleinformatics industries. For example, in telecom-
munications, the separate national administrations (PTTs)' 2 have
developed distinct technologies,' 3 procurement procedures, 14 and
tariff and service policies.':' European teleinformatic enterprises
cannot, in their present form, effectively compete in either the world
or European market with U.S. and Japanese industries.' 6 Policies of
a purely national dimension render the task of creating economies of
scale difficult and expensive. 17 Given such depressing prospects, the
Commission decided to enter the teleinformatics field and attempt to
devise solutions within the EC framework.
II
THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE
Based upon its recommendations in the Dublin Report, the
Commission, on September 1, 1980, invited the Council of Ministers
(Council) to develop a comprehensive strategy to meet the challenge
of the new technologies.' 8 The formal communication calls for peri-
odic referral to the Council of "measures that [the Commission]
deems appropriate, including budget measures where necessary"
designed to achieve the goals of the Dublin Report.' 9 The First
Commission Report was a communication of the activities of the
are of a high technical standard and that the volume of sale will allow very competitive
prices." Id at 8-9.
12. As used in this Article, the term PTTs refers to the national postal, telephone,
and telecommunications administrations of the EC Member States.
13. See notes 108-15 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 123-24 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 290-300 infra and accompanying text.
16. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 12. It is believed that such domination by the
United States and Japan in the short term would result in:
-the final loss of European control over an essential field;
---damage to the competitive position of the Community both in Europe and in
the rest of the world;
-- the loss of the potential new jobs, which should compensate for loss of jobs
caused by the new technologies;
-a reduction in [European] independence in decision-making in all walks of
public and private life.
Id
17. Id at 15.
18. The formal communication from the Commission to the Council is contained in
First Commission Report, note 6 supra.
19. Id at 1.
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Commission in the area.20 The Commission proposed "lines of
action" with three main aims:
(1) to initiate measures to help society and industry to master the new tech-
nologies and adapt to their use;
(2) to establish a uniform EC market by encouraging common standards;
and
(3) to create and promote new markets for the new technologies and to
strengthen corresponding European industrial capacity.
2 1
Many portions of the Commission's proposed strategy are not new.
Rather, the proposal in large part represents an amalgam of various
EC policies developed over the past seven years in the fields of data
processing, informatics, microelectronics, telecommunications, and
privacy protection. Nonetheless, the comprehensive proposal repre-
sents a major departure from the EC's piecemeal approach dictated
by numerous and uncoordinated national programs.
A. PROJECTS TO PREPARE SOCIETY FOR INNOVATION
The teleinformatics revolution will certainly have profound
implications for European societies. Many Europeans still view the
new technologies with hostility, fearing the potential adverse effects
on employment and privacy protection. To gain political support for
the rapid introduction of new technologies into Europe, the Com-
mission has structured its policies to take due account of the underly-
ing social concerns involved.22 The Commission proposal calls for
an overall strategy involving "measures" on the part of companies,
national governments, and the EC.23
1. Labor
The effect of the new technologies on employment and working
conditions is one of the major concerns of European trade unions
and professional associations.24 The EC must respond to these con-
cerns if it hopes to obtain political support for its programs. Euro-
pean workers and their unions will not endorse programs designed
20. Id
21. Id at3.
22. See Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 5-6.
23. Id at 13-17. Companies are merely to "operate profitably in the market and to
promote their own development under whatever conditions the public authorities may
lay down." Id at 14. Regarding national governments, the Commission endorsed vari-
ous state aid programs proposed by or currently underway in the Member States. The
Commission also foresees the national authorities playing an "essential role" in trade-
promotion through the placing of public orders. Id For a discussion of EC measures,
see notes 123-34 & 301-09 infra and accompanying text.
24. Id at 18. See extensive bibliography in Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Employment and the New Micro-Electronic Technology, Doc. COM (80) 1 final at
annex 11-14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Employment Report].
1981]
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to ,encourage the new technologies if such programs will lead to the
loss of jobs.
Some Member States have already begun efforts to educate
workers on the realities of the new technologies. 25 The Commission
now recommends that such efforts be strengthened, and calls for the
elevation of the dialogue between management and industry to the
EC level.26 First, by "consulting the two sides of industry," labor
and management, the Commission hopes to facilitate the conclusion
of outline agreements or collective wage agreements addressing such
issues as wages, job security, working conditions, health and safety
standards, and retraining of workers displaced by the new technolo-
gies. 27 Second, the Commission proposes a community pool "to cen-
tralize studies, research work and information on the impact of new
technologies on employment." 28 Third, the Commission calls for a
"periodic assessment of the impact of telematic systems and services
on society." 29
Before the issuance of the First Commission Report, the Com-
mission had already begun examining the impact of microelectronic
advances on eiployment.30 In the earlier study the Commission
concluded that the public authorities and their "social partners"
must indicate their views on social and employment problems associ-
ated with the rapid development of the microelectronics industry.3'
Moreover, these parties should be called upon "to define appropriate
procedures for discussion and negotiation" at the appropriate orga-
nizational level.32 The Commission proposed numerous lines of
action, including: (1) developing economic policies in order to
maintain and encourage demand for new microelectronic technol-
ogy; (2) increasing the awareness of problems that the new technolo-
gies raised in terms of work conditions; (3) improving the quality of
life by application of the new technologies; (4) developing new
vocational training programs; (5) adapting and developing labor
market measures (guidance, placement, mobility) to avoid job mis-
matching; (6) adapting social protection arrangements to ensure that
the new technologies do not adversely affect the standard of living of
25. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 18.
26. Id at 18-19.
27. Id at 19.
28. Id
29. Id (emphasis omitted). This assessment is to be made every five years, using the
so-called Delphi method or representative sampling used "with great success" by the
Japanese. Id at 20.
30. See Employment Report, note 24 supra.
31. Id at 11.
32. Id
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workers; and (7) directing major information campaigns. 33 It is up
to the public authorities and "social partners" to cooperate in imple-
menting these actions. The Commission, too, has expressed its will-
ingness to encourage cooperation.34 The proposed lines of action
may ultimately require an EC directive to deal with European trade
union concerns over such matters as minimum employment levels,
rights to training, job reclassification, employment security, and
working conditions. The authority of the EC to issue such a direc-
tive can be found in the Treaty of Rome's goal of promoting the free
movement of workers.35
2. Privacy Protection and Individual Freedom
A second essential aspect of the Commission's project to pre-
pare European society for the new technologies involves the protec-
tion of individual freedoms. EC institutions began examining the
threat of data processing to personal privacy at least four years
before issuing the Dublin Report. In 1975, for example, the Euro-
pean Parliament recommended that the Commission prepare a
directive on the protection of individual rights against abuses arising
from data processing.3 6
Beginning in 1973, an increasing number of European countries
began to enact data protection laws.37 So far, two different data pro-
tection systems have been adopted, represented by the approaches of
33. Id at 11-12.
34. Id at 13.
35. The Commission is sensitive to the interests of the EC's labor force and has expe-
rience in developing programs to ensure that labor concerns are adequately addressed.
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive on Proce-
dures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex
Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, Doc. COM (80) 423 final (1980).
See also notes 226-30 infra and accompanying text.
36. In May 1979 the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament issued the
Bayerl Report, [1979-1980] Eur. Parl. Doc. (No. 100) (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bayerl
Report], in which it stated:
The statement in the 1975 Resolution that "a Directive on individual freedom
and data-processing is an urgent necessity, not only to ensure that Community
citizens enjoy maximum protection against abuses or failures of data-processing
procedures, but also to avoid the development of conflicting national data-pro-
tection legislation" is even more relevant today than it was then.
Id at 21. The Legal Affairs Committee found that, while privacy is certainly a prime
concern of the EC, "[o]f almost equal importance is the principle of free international
flow of information." Id at 22. The Committee expressed its concern for "protectionist
measures" takii-5y-Member States as a result of differing legislation. The Committee
labeled the situation "damaging for European integration." Id at 22.
37. See generally F. HONDius, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE (1975).
France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and the Federal Republic of Germany all have data protection laws of one type of
another. See Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87, 94 (1980); Kirby,
Transborder Data Flows and the "Basic Rules" of Data Privacy, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 27,
39 (1980).
19811
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Sweden 38 and Germany.39 Differences exist among the various
national laws as to the treatment of automated and manual files, 40
public and private data banks,4' and legal and natural persons.42
These differences in the laws of the Member States prompted the
European Parliament in late 1979 to demand that the Commission
formulate a directive aimed at harmonizing the laws of the various
Member States.4 3
For the most part, EC institutions have applauded the continu-
ing efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)44 and the Council of Europe45 to conclude
multilateral data protection agreements. In the 1979 Bayeri Report,
however, the Legal Affairs Committee opined that an EC directive
would be a desirable addition to the OECD and Council of Europe
agreements, because the former is not binding, and the latter is
"optional to its 21 member states" and is subject to a potentially
lengthy adoption and ratification process. 4 6 An EC directive, there-
fore, may be a necessary alternative or addition to the international
agreements, if effective harmonization of the various states' laws is to
occur.
The Commission, while definitely concerned with protecting the
individual from the possible abuses associated with data processing/
flow/storage, also has the responsibility of preserving the fundamen-
tal economic principles and objectives of the Treaty of Rome.47 For
example, the Commission has stressed that harmonious development
of economic activities within the EC calls for the creation of a genu-
ine common market in data processing in which the free movement
of goods, the right of establishment, and freedom of private services
are assured, and competition is not distorted.48 All data protection
38. Bayed Report, supra note 36, at 24.
39. Id
40. Some of the Member State rules cover both automated and manual files, some
only one kind. The Legal Affairs Committee prefers legislation covering both manual
and automatic processing. Bayed Report, supra note 36, at 25.
41. European laws tend to be omnibus in nature, covering both public and private
files in the same act. In the United States, separate data protection laws govern each
sector. R. Turn, Review of TDF Legislation 2 (December 1979) (unpublished paper for
TDF Presentation on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
42. For a discussion on whether data protection should be extended to legal as well
as natural persons, see Bayed Report, supra note 36, at 25-27.
43. Bayed Report, note 36 supra.
44. See generally Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data lows, 16 STAN. J.
LNr'L. L. 1, 15-23 (1980).
45. Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108.
46. Bayed Report, supra note 36, at 23.
47. See notes 171-309 infra and accompanying text.
48. Id
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laws erect barriers to the transnational flow of data. To the extent
that national laws are overly restrictive, the EC may wish to issue a
directive prohibiting them in the future.49
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF A HOMOGENEOUS MARKET
According to the Commission, the EC's largest unexploited
asset is its continental market; in particular, that portion of the mar-
ket occupied by public procurements.50 The EC will develop and
prosper in teleinformatics only if suppliers of goods and services are
confident they will have a sufficiently large market to compete inter-
nationally.51 Moreover, users of developing European telein-
formatic services must be able to obtain desired services and equip-
ment under favorable market conditions.5 2 At present, however, the
internal European market for teleinformatic goods and services
remains fragmented because of differing Member State administra-
tive procedures, technical rules, national preferences, and the con-
flicting financial interests of the various PTTs.:
The Commission would like to create conditions similar to those
in the United States. The United States has been able to exploit its
continental scale for teleinformatic goods and services as a result of a
standardized, yet dynamic, teleinformatics infrastructure. The com-
mon standards allowing for a homogeneous market in the United
States result from the predominate roles of large firms such as AT&T
and IBM and of Federal Communications Commission policies. 54
In Europe, however, no public or private authority fulfills this
harmonization function on a Community-wide basis. Limited coop-
eration does exist through the European Conference of Post and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)55 and the Interna-
tional Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
49. See Bayed Report, note 36 supra. The Council has the authority to issue direc-
tives under Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 100.
50. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 23.
51. Id at 24.
52. Id
53. Id at 15; Commission of the European Communities, Recommendations on
Telecommunications, Doc. COM (80) 422 final at explanatory memorandum 2 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Telecommunications Report).
54. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 24. For a comparison of the U.S. telecommuni-
cations market with the market in other countries, see Markoski, Telecommunications
Regulations as Barriers to the ransborder Flow of Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L..
287 (1981).
55. The European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Administrations
(CEPT) is made up of representatives from 26 European countries. It is governed by a
biennial plenary conference and two permanent commissions that deal respectly with the
posts and telecommunications. See Markoski, supra note 54, at 298 n.47.
1981]
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(CCITT).56 Recommendations resulting from consultation within
these two groups, however, are neither legally enforceable nor sup-
ported by what the Commission describes as "strategic decisions of
joint industrial policy." 57 Consequently, the Commission has rec-
ommended that the Council use its powers of standardization to har-
monize the European markets in telecommunications and data
processing.5 8
L Telecommunications
An efficient and economically viable telecommunications sys-
tem will be essential in order for Europe to support a vast range of
teleinformatic services. The Commission has strongly supported the
efforts of the PTTs to cooperate in developing integrated digital
transmission and switching networks that would enable enterprises
to offer a broad new range of teleinformatic services.59 Currently,
Europe has neither Community-wide services nor a Community-
wide market for terminals and other telecommunications equipment.
56. The CCITT i one of four permanent organs of the International Telecommuni-
cations Union. International Telecommunications Convention, done October 25, 1973,
art. 5,28 U.S.T. 2497, T.I.A.S. No. 8572. The CCITT's duties include studying technical,
operating, and tariff questions relating to telegraphy and telephony and to issue recom-
mendations on them. Id art. 11. The working structure of the CCITT is set forth in
article 58 of the Convention. The CCITT does not play a significant role in setting
national standards regarding the design of telecommunications equipment. Such deci-
sions are left to the individual PTTs who generally set their own standards and specify
what local manufacturers will produce. Study by S. Gill, P.A. Management Consultants
Ltd., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Conference
on Computer/Telecommunications Policy 185, 218 (Feb. 4-6, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Gill Report].
57. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 24.
58. Community authority to enact harmonizing directives is the subject of Articles 3
and 100 of the Treaty of Rome, note 3 supra. Article 3(h) provides for "the approxima-
tion of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the
common market." Id art. 3. Article 100 gives the Council, "acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission," the power to "issue directives for the approximation of
such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." Id art. 100.
Where the Commission finds that differences among various national laws are "dis-
torting the conditions of competition in the common market," the Council, on a proposal
from the Commission, has the power under Article 101 to legislate by a qualified major-
ity in order to eliminate the distortion in question. Id art. 101. See generally P. MAHtu-
sEN, supra note 3, at 108-10.
The distinction between Articles 100 and 101 is potentially important in the
teleinformatics field. For example, if a proposed line of action calls for approximation of
national procedures regarding standards or procurement, the Treaty of Rome requires
unanimity in the Council. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 100. Thus, any affected
Member State could effectively block the adoption of such a directive. Conversely, if a
particular line of action calls for a directive to eliminate distortions of competition
caused by national regulations the Council can act by qualified majority vote. Id art.
101. See note 244-75 infra and accompanying text.
59. See Dublin Report, supra note I, at 24; Telecommunications Report, supra note
53, explanatory memorandum, at 3.
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The Commission views the European situation as "strikingly differ-
ent" from that in the United States, where terminal users have the
right, as well as the technical capability, to plug into any common
carrier network and obtain transcontinental communication.60
In 1977, the Commission and the PTTs established a Working
Group on Future Networks that subsequently recommended meas-
ures in the field of digital networks with a view toward establishing
Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs).61 ISDNs are net-
works with sophisticated digital transmission and switching capabili-
ties that provide the user with multiple voice, video, and data
communication services over the same transmission medium.
The Commission believes that the introduction of ISDNs by all
Community PTTs offers a unique opportunity for harmonization.62
Harmonization efforts require substantial resources, skilled workers,
and time. If the Working Group reaches agreement on a harmoniza-
tion plan, the Member State PTTs will be called upon to implement
any recommendations that the Working Group makes.63 This
implementation process, however, must take place in the midst of
"different national services, technologies and procedures inherited
from the past and in the presence of inevitable competitive commer-
cial interests.""
Against this background, the Commission submitted three draft
recommendations and one draft declaration65 on harmorization to
the Council in September 1980.66 These proposed measures are
designed to create political support for the implementation of the
CEPT and CCITT measures, irrespective of differing inclinations
among the CEPT participants.
60. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, explanatory memorandum, at 2-3.
61. Id explanatory memorandum, at 3-4.
62. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations, at 1.
63. Under the procedures of CEPT and the CCITT, the PTTs will not be bound to
follow working group recommendations. The PTTs will likely attempt to follow such
recommendations, however, since they are active participants in the CEPTs and the
CCI1Ts policy formulation process.
64. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, explanatory memorandum, at 4.
65. Interestingly, the Commission chose the weakest of all EC legislative measures,
the recommendation, as the appropriate vehicle for implementing a new community tele-
communications strategy. Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome states that
"[r]ecommendation and opinions shall have no binding force." Treaty of Rome, supra
note 3, art. 189. Also noteworthy is the Commission proposal for a Council "declara-
tion"-a measure not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. In a detailed explanation of
these proposals, the Commission referred to the "declaration" as a fourth "recommenda-
tion" thereby suggesting that it too had no binding force.
66. Telecommunications Report, note 53 supra.
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a. 'Draft Recommendation I
The Commission's First Draft Recommendation contains four
suggestions for PTT activity in teleinformatics. First, the Draft Rec-
ommendation calls upon the PTTs to consult with each other before
introducing new teleinformatic services.67 The Recommendation's
consultation mechanism is designed to avoid technical disparities
that might adversely affect subsequent EC harmonization measures.
The Commission is apparently seeking a genuine commitment to
consult both at a policy level and a technical level.68 The Recom-
mendation, however, leaves the PTTs free to choose an appropriate
time and framework for such consultations.69 Second, the recom-
mendation proposes that the introduction of new teleinformatic serv-
ices after 1983 follow a "common harmonized approach." 70 This
proposal implies further cooperative measures including administra-
tive efforts to define the type and scope of new services, implement
common policies, and pool market studies with a view toward adopt-
ing a common market approach.71 Third, the Recommendation pro-
vides that begining in 1985 the PTTs should order digital and
switching systems that will be technically compatible, and will facili-
tate harmonization and integration.72 Finally, the Recommendation
calls upon the PITs to regularly inform the Commission of the pro-
gress of the work in CEPT.73 In conjunction with the last suggestion,
the Commission assures that it will review the PTTs' progress regu-
larly and report back to the Council by January 1985. Whenever
necessary, the Commission shall make appropriate proposals to the
Council in order to ensure Community-wide harmonization of net-
works, services, and equipment.74
Draft Recommendation I, while clear in stating its objectives, is
vague in suggesting effective mechanisms to achieve them. The
Commission apparently avoided making substantive recommenda-
tions in the belief that the PTTs would challenge them as being
outside the competence of the EC institutions.7" In other words, the
Commission evidently believed that it was not an opportune time
politically for the EC to assert meaningful jurisdiction over the
67. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations 11, at 2.
68. Id annex, at 3.
69. The Commission expresses a preference that the consultations take place within
the framework of CEPT. Id text of recommendations, at 2.
70. Id 2at2.
71. Id annex, at 3-4.
72. Id text of recommendations 3, at 2.
73. Id 4 at 2.
74. Id at 2.
75. See notes 184-87 infra for discussion of the political relationship between the
Member State PTTs and the EC.
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PTTs.7 6
Draft Recommendation I also reflects a large amount of Com-
mission optimism. The Recommendation envisages positive results
from consultation procedures by 1985. There is little evidence that a
consensus currently exists among the various PTTs regarding equip-
ment standardization."7 In addition, due to lengthy depreciation
schedules on present telecommunications facilities, Recommenda-
tion I would probably have little impact on large portions of the EC
telecommunications systems for many years.78
Another problem with Draft Recommendation I stems from its
apparent assumption that the consultation process will take place
among similarly situated PTTs. Policy differences with regard to the
development of new services exist among the European PTTs reflect-
ing different technological capabilities.7 9 When engaging in the con-
sultations prescribed in the Draft Recommendation, the PTTs must
resolve these policy differences if they are to achieve the Commis-
sion's harmonization goals.
b. Draft Recommendation II
The goal of Draft Recommendation II is the creation of a Com-
munity-wide market for leasing and purchasing terminal equip-
ment. 0 Full exploitation of the European terminal market requires
that private firms, in addition to the PTTs, be permitted to supply
76. There may be several bases upon which the Commission may justify the exercise
ofjurisdiction over the PITs. For example, one European commentator already believes
that the Commission could challenge CEPT agreements as violating the Treaty of Rome
competition rules. For further discussion see notes 269-75 infra and accompanying text.
77. The individual PTTs, to a large extent, set their own national standards. Gill
Report, supra note 56, at 207.
78. Gill notes that in comparison to "other businesses of a similar technical nature,
telecommunications carriers have adopted relatively long periods over which to depreci-
ate their investments in plant and equipment." i at 210. The British Post Office, for
example, depreciates telephones over 20 to 25 years, exchanges over 16-29 years, and
telephone lines and cables over 19 to 40 years. Id Such practices are common through-
out the world. .1d PTIs will not be in a position to immediately adjust depreciation
schedules to accommodate the aims of Draft Recommendation I.
79. The divergence of policy between the British and the French is an example. The
British are less advanced than the French in the area of digital switching, and tend to
develop new services, in part, on the basis of current capabilities.
80. In traditional telecommunications systems, the telephone set is the primary user
terminal. The new technologies, however, have made available to the user hundreds of
new types of terminals. Recommendation II does not attempt to define what constitutes
a telematic terminal. Instead, it indicates what is not a terminal, and includes in this list
"telephone sets for main stations, Private Automatic Branch Exchanges (PABXs) for
traditional telephony, conventional teleprinter machines and initially modems not form-
ing part of terminal devices." Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recom-
mendations, at 3. In a detailed explanation of the Recommendations, the Commission
makes clear that a first priority of the PTTs should be "to arrive at an agreed definition of
terminals... " I annex, at 7.
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equipment to users. The Commission concluded that only "[a] Com-
munity market can offer users the widest benefits of innovation and
choice and offer suppliers of new terminals the economies of scale
which can enable them to write off rapidly the costs of development
and investment in new products."81
Draft Recommendation II proposes that users within the EC be
free to lease or purchase new types of telematic terminal equipment
from either private suppliers or from the PTTs.82 Moreover, the
Commission recommends specific actions to ensure that the Euro-
pean terminal market is operated on a non-discriminatory basis. In
this regard, the Recommendation focuses on type approval proce-
dures.83 Recommendation II encourages the PTTs to move rapidly
toward reciprocity with regard to type approval procedures. The
Recommendation also states that, beginning in 1981, the PTTs
should receive supply tenders from manufacturers of other Member
States before purchasing telematic terminal equipment themselves.8 4
Draft Recommendation II provides for periodic consultation
between the Commission and the PTTs to ensure that an open mar-
ket "is being achieved without undesirable consequences for the pat-
tern of Community trade with the outside world."185 According to
the Commission, existing agreements will cover non-European ter-
minal suppliers.8 6 The Council has already adopted a Decision pro-
viding that type approval arrangements should not discriminate
against non-European suppliers from nations with a reciprocal
81. Id explanatory memorandum, at 5. Certain Member States have already recog-
nized the need for private terminal suppliers. The British, for example, announced in
September 1980, plans to open up its telecommunications system to "approved equip-
ment" of private suppliers. United-Kind-6m users could, as a result of such liberaliza-
tion, buy terminal equipment from European and non-European suppliers. See
ECONOMIsT, Dec. 6, 1980, at 64; DATAMATION, Oct. 1970, at 78. Several commentators
suggest that the British plan may make it possible for private firms to provide value-
added services, an area long limited to the British Post and Telegraph Monopoly. E.g.,
Markoski, supra note 54, at 294 n.30.
82. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations, at 3.
83. "Type approval" refers to those procedures and tests that terminal equipment
must pass before a PT will permit it to be attached to the public common carrier net-
work. Id annex, at 7. The Commission takes the position that the PTT monopoly cov-
ers transmission between subscribers including all types of switching and transmission
links (satellite and cable). Id text of recommendations, at 9. Thus, the network extends
to a termination point at the user's premises. At that point the network can only interface
with "type approved" terminal equipment. Id annex, at 7.
84. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations 1 3, at 4.
The Commission envisages progress first in the area of public procurement, with a gen-
eral liberalization of the terminal equipment market to follow. The strategy mirrors that
of the Commission in the area of data processing. See notes 97-134 infra and accompa-
nying text.
85. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations 4, at 4.
86. Id annex, at 12.
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policy.87
In its report accompanying Recommendation II, the Commis-
sion concluded that its proposed Recommendation must not
prejudice its basic responsibility to ensure that the Treaty of Rome's
rules on competition are enforced.88 Thus the Commission appears
to be offering a subtle warning to both private industry and public
administrations: They are to avoid restrictive practices to the extent
these practices frustrate the creation of a competitive market in
terminals.8 9
c. Draft Recommendation III
The Commission's third Recommendation addresses the open-
ing up of public contracts. Recommendation III, if implemented,
would initiate a phase of action during which the PTTs vould "gain
experience" in "inviting" tenders for a minimum proportion of their
purchases from other EC countries on a non-discriminatory basis.90
The Commission also recommends that during the period 1981 to
1983 the PTTs seek competitive proposals from EC suppliers of ter-
minal equipment for at least ten percent of their annual orders.9'
Recommendation III further cautions that its proposal is made
"without prejudice to the applicability of the rules of t.he Treaty [of
Rome], especially Articles 30 and 86."92 In Recommendation III, as
in Recommendation II, the Commission appears to be putting on
notice those enterprises, public or private, that might prefer to con-
tinue practices proscribed under the Treaty of Rome, especially
those practices that restrict the free flow of goods or otherwise distort
competition within the EC.93 Finally, Draft Recommendation III
calls on the Commission to monitor the progress of the recom-
mended actions.94
d. Draft Declaration
A proposed Council Declaration would establish an Advisory
Liaison Committee to monitor progress, identify policy problems,
and propose actions to ensure the effective implementation of the
87. Id
88. Id The Commission currently has authority to attack restrictive barriers to com-
petition whether or not Recommendations are ever implemented. See notes 247-309
infra and accompanying text.
89. Id
90. I text of recommendations 1, at 5.
91. Id 12, at 5.
92. Id at 5.
93. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text; notes 247-309 infra and accompa-
nying text.
94. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, text of recommendations 3, at 5-6.
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three Recommendations. 95 The Committee would represent both
the Commission and the PTTs, but the Commission states that ulti-
mate responsibility for development of the European telecommuni-
cations market rests "on the shoulders of the telecommunications
administrations themselves, supported by the firm political commit-
ment of the Member States .. -"96
An overview of the Commission's proposals reveals the cautious
approach the Commission is presently taking in addressing the com-
plex problem of creating an integrated EC telecommunications
infrastructure. The EC officials are apparently reluctant to enter the
field of telecommunications regulation too rapidly; a field tradition-
ally viewed as the exclusive domain of the national administrations.
At this time, encouraging cooperation may be the only politically
realistic means of achieving the goal of harmonization.
2 Data Processing
Since issuance of the Council Resolution on Data Processing of
1974,97 the Conimission has focused much of its attention on achiev-
ing harmonization and standardization in the field of data process-
ing. The Commission considers it vital to implement a common
strategy reflecting "the realities of the data-processing scene."98 The
"realities" center around developing strategies to meet IBM's global
domination of the market in computer equipment and software.99
The Commission's goal since 1975 has been "to promote and
encourage the formation of at least one major European-based
95. Id at 7.
96. Id annex, at 14.
97. Council Resolution of 15 July 1974 on a Community Policy on Data Processing,
17 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 86) (1974). [hereinafter cited as 1974 Council Resolution on
Data Processing]. The 1974 Resolution noted the need for a defined EC policy "to pro-
mote research, industrial development and applications of data processing." Id 3. The
Council invited the Commission to report on the European situation and to submit pro-
posals. Id 4.
98. Commission of the European Communities, Community Policy for Data-
Processing, Doc. COM (75) 467 final 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Commission
Report on Data-Processing].
99. Id at 3. The Commission warned in its 1975 report that "[t]he challenge of IBM,
however, remains daunting and is taking a new form as it makes rapid progress towards
providing customers with a total information system, including telecommunications
facilities, and an immense variety of possible online applications systems." Id See also
[1973-1974] EuR. PA.RL. Doc. (No. 153) (1974). [hereinafter cited as the 1974 Coust6
Report]. The Coust6 Report notes that, "[i]n spite of the enormous importance of data-
processing to the Community, Europe has ... been obliged to proceed almost entirely
on the basis of American technology .... More than 90% of the computers installed in
Europe are based on American technology, and a single American company IBM, holds
about 60% of the European market." Coust6 Report, supra, 12, at 26 (emphasis added).
The largest European firms ICL (English), CII (French), SIEMENS (West German), and
PHILIPS (Dutch) are "dwarfs" by comparison. Id
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grouping capable of sustaining a viable economic existence and of
achieving balanced partnership with partners in the United States
and Japan."' 00
In its 1975 Report, the Commission noted "two contradictory
trends" as the world enters "the era of distributed computing."'' 1
The first trend involves the progressive creation of new opportunities
for diversified and decentralized data processing services. According
to the Commission, this trend can continue only if the public author-
ities "create a framework of standards, procurement and aid which
prevent monopolisation and assist this process of diversification."10 2
The second, "less attractive" trend, however, involves the progres-
sive development by a single company of comprehensive systems
and software services to meet virtually every data processing need,
thereby "lock[ing] customers in for many years to come [and]
severely limiting their freedom of choice .... 1"o3 The latter trend
would continue unless public authorities work to provide a favorable
environment for alternative suppliers.'0 4
In evaluating its options, the Commission has paid particular
attention to the goals of the 1974 Council Resolution Io5 and has con-
cluded that: (1) it is not acceptable to users or to the public for a
single company to dominate the technology of central processors and
distributed computing; (2) at least some part of this important
industry must be under European control; (3) the European market
for data processing equipment is too large to go unattended; and (4)
it is possible for a variety of European companies to thrive in this
industry provided they can operate in a favorable European environ-
ment and are properly promoted. 10 6 The Commission has elabo-
rated upon these and related policies in developing EC programs
relating to data processing standardization, portability, and procure-
ment.'0 7 These programs are designed to permit users (including the
PTTs themselves) of teleinformatic products to obtain equipment
and software from a variety of suppliers, to reduce conversion costs,
and to attract new suppliers and facilities into the European market.
100. 1975 Commission Report on Data-Processing, supra note 98, at 2.
101. Id at 4-6.
102. Id at 4.
103. Id
104. Id
105. 1974 Council Resolution on Data Processing, note 97 supra.
106. 1975 Commission Report on Data-Processing, supra note 98, at 5.
107. The systematic EC programs envisaged in the 1974 Council Resolution on Data
Processing, note 97 supra, are now referred to as multinational programs.
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a., Standards Policy
The Commission views Community-wide standards as essential
to the creation of a free and competitive data processing market in
which users will be able to combine equipment and software from
different suppliers and begin to use new products without high con-
version costs.108 Once the standards have been agreed upon, they
should be applied by impartial public bodies representing a broad
spectrum of industrial and user interests. The Commission wishes to
avoid a situation where standards are "imposed by an individual
dominant concern, whose standards inevitably change without
regard to such wider interests (of users and industry)."' 0 9
In 1975, as a first step in formulating an EC policy on data
processing standards, the Commission established the Working
Group on Standards." f0 The Working Group is responsible for rec-
ommending and formulating policies for the implementation of EC
standards in the data processing field."' The Commission hopes
that the Group's work will promote the efforts of other public
research and siupport bodies to ensure' that public procurement and
other national policies support, implement, and require suppliers to
respect recommended EC standards." 2 Priority activities for which
the Working Group on Standards has already set up appropriate
working parties include: (1) defining standards for the data process-
ing language COBOL;" 3 (2) developing network standards, which
are critical to the development of distributed data processing;" 4 and
(3) developing a new European-based international standard lan-
guage for use in real-time data processing systems." f5
108. See 1975 Commission Report on Data-Processing, supra note 98, at 6.
109. Id at 6.
110. Id at7.
111. Id
112. Id at9.
113. Id at 7. When the Commission established the Working Group on Standards in
1975 COBOL was the most widely used high level language in data processing. Partly in
response to these EC initiatives CEPT, see note 55 supra, established its own working
parties to work on the harmonization of future telecommunications services and stan-
dards. This work illustrates the complex and interdependent problems associated with
the process of planning data processing and telecommunications systems.
114. Id
115. Id "Real-time" is the processing method that is capable of receiving data at any
time and obtaining results immediately. The reaction time varies as a function of pro-
cessing constraints as well as of need. A "real-time network" consists of terminal equip-
ment, a transmission network, and processing equipment, operating in a manner that
enables several users to have simultaneous access to it, with each of their requests being
fulfilled within a given time and at given intervals. An example of a real-time network is
an air or train ticket reservation system. See S. NoRA & A. MINC, THa COMPUTERIZA-
TION oF SociETY 174 (1980).
In 1975 the Commission predicted that by 1980 real-time data processing systems
would represent one-third of the data processing market. Thus, the Commission pro-
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b. Portability
Another aspect of the Commission's data processing policy
involves the promotion of portable' 16 software. 117 Portable software
allows the user to transfer his applications to new hardware or to use
otherwise incompatible items of equipment simultaneously."1 8 A
properly formulated portability policy would reduce conversion
costs to users of data processing systems by increasing the life of
software products and by permitting wider integration of diverse
software products and equipment.' 19 In addition, increased portabil-
ity may provide the user with greater freedom of choice and a
broader range of matching requirements as well as offer greater
flexibility in data exchange and task assignment procedures. 120
Finally, the Commission believes that increased portability will pro-
mote and facilitate competition among suppliers, thereby enabling
European nondominant producers to penetrate the data processing
market more easily. 121 EC efforts in the area of portability have
included studies on software language, conversion tools, and the fea-
sibility of developing a common software interface for
minicomputers.122
posed a European initiative to create a standard language to replace the numerous sepa-
rate national languages destined to become obsolete. Taking this initiative, the EC
moved towards creating a homogenous and competitive data processing market.
116. Programs are portable if different data processing systems can execute them with-
out modifying the application software and the data. S. NoRA & A. MiNc, supra note
115, at 172.
117. Software refers to the entire set of programs, procedures, rules, and documents
related to the operation of data processing systems. Id at 176.
118. 1975 Commission Report on Data-Processing, supra note 98, at 8.
119. Id
120. See Council Decision of 27 September 1977 adopting a Series of Informatics
Projects in the Field of Software Portability, 20 O.3. EUR. COMM. (No. L 255) 22 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Council Decision on Portability]. The decision states:
"Accordingly, when applications are transferred to new hardware, or when they are
processed simultaneously by different items of equipment, the degree of difficulty
encountered by the user will depend on what, for sake of convenience, will be called
'portability'." Id annex, at 23.
121. See 1975 Commission Report on Data-Processing, supra note 98, at 9. The Com-
mission theorizes that economies of scale confer on dominant data processing manufac-
turers the ability to develop and market a very wide range of software applications.
European-based suppliers, taken separately, are not in a position to market so wide a
range of applications. Id Thus, the availability of portable software facilitates the com-
bination of equipment of different manufacturers with applications developed by other
software and hardware companies. Ironically, increased portability may create an envi-
ronment more beneficial to the dominant U.S. suppliers than to the European
companies.
The EC institutions may also be able to justify their work in the portability area based
on the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome. See notes 247-309 infra and accompa-
nying text.
122. See 1976 Council Decision on Portability, supra note 120, annex, at 24.
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c., Procurement Policy
Another element of the Commission's data processing strategy
is the coordination of public procurement policies, an objective as
important for creating an open and competitive data processing mar-
ket as it is in the telecommunications sector.12 3 The importance of
coordinating public procurement policies in data processing is
demonstrated by the fact that public markets account for thirty per-
cent of the entire EC data processing market. 124
The new Commission procurement policy has three main objec-
tives: (1) assisting public buyers in obtaining a wider and more eco-
nomical choice of equipment;125 (2) creating a more open and
homogeneous market for industry, ensuring that European-based
companies have access to all EC contracts on the same conditions;126
and (3) encouraging the procurement, throughout the EC, of data
processing equipment, software, and services from European-based
companies.127
Toward achieving these objectives, the Council issued a direc-
tive in December 1976128 coordinating procedures for the award of
public supply contracts. The Directive requires that, after January
1981; supply contracts for data processing be open to competitive
tender. 129 It is yet unclear, however, whether the Directive, as sup-
123. Restrictive national procurement policies in either sector create barriers to a
homogeneous market.
124. See Commission of the European Communities, A Four-Year Programme for
the Development of Informatics in the Community, Doc. COM (76) 524 final 5 (1977).
The Commission believes that the scope and potential for a rational public procurement
policy is best shown by the United States experience where "federal government policy
has ensured that certain standards have been imposed (for example COBOL), where the
practice of buying rather than leasing equipment is common ... and where IBM had in
1975 only 36 percent of the park by value, compared with 68 percent in the US market as
a whole." Id
125. Id at 5. This occurs by "exchange of experience and adoption of the best com-
mon practices." Id
126. Id
127. Id The Commission only encourages the procurement of equipment and serv-
ices comparable in price and performance to other equipment, software, and services.
128. Council Directive of 21 December 1976, Coordinating Procedures for the Award
of Public Supply Contracts, 20 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 13) (1977).
129. See id Article (6) of the Council Directive states that
contracting authorities may award their supply contracts without applying the
procedures referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in the following cases: . .. (h) for
equipment supply contracts in the field of data-processing, and subject to any
decisions of the Council taken on a proposal from the Commission and defining
the categories of material to which the present exception does not apply. There
can no longer be recourse to thepresent exception after I January i981 other than
by a decision of the Council taken on a proposalfrom the Commission to modIy
this date.
Id (emphasis added).
Thus, any exceptions that may exist to the open awarding of public supply contracts in
the area of data processing are now expired. See also Council Directive of 22 July 1980,
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plemented, will cover all "contracting authorities" in the EC. 30
What is clear is that the Commission is convinced that the creation
of a homogeneous market in data processing depends on the imposi-
tion of common standards and requirements on procurements by
public authorities. The Dublin Report proposed that the Council
issue a decision to the Member States that would "oblige" their
administrations to "adopt common standards for all their equip-
ment, to offer EC users the same approved data exchange facilities,
and to see that these facilities are incorporated in all equipment they
buy after 1983."''31
The most recent EC initiative in the area of data processing is
the 1979-1983 multiannual program adopted by the Council of Min-
isters in September 1979.132 The new four-year program concen-
trates on general measures such as standardization policy and public
procurement, as well as various promotional measures relating to
software and applications. 33 By a contemporaneously issued regu-
lation the Council empowered the Commission to offer financial aid
for feasibility studies on data processing in the EC and for
predevelopment studies, development projects, and pilot projects
that promote the general aims of the program. 34
Adapting and Supplementing in Respect of Certain Contracting Authorities Directive
77/62/EEC Coordinating Procedures for the Award of Public Supply Contracts 23 O.J.
Eu. COMM. (No. L 215) (1980) [hereinafter cited as Council Directive of 22 July 1980].
130. The original list of affected "contracting authorities" was very limited. Council
Directive of 21 December 1976, Coordinating Procedures for the Award of Public Supply
Contracts, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) art. 1, at 2 (1977). The Supplementing Direc-
tive increased the list substantially. Council Directive of 22 July 1980, supra note 129,
art. 1, at 2. While most of the "contracting authorities" are now included in the list, the
PTTs continue to be excluded.
131. See Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 26. See also discussion on restrictions
against the free flow of goods, notes 200-19 infa and accompanying text.
132. Council Decision of 11 September 1979 Adopting a Multi-annual Programme
(1979 to 1983) in the Field of Data-Processing, 22 OJ. Eun- COMM. (No. L 231) 23
(1979).
133. Id Given a rather ambitious agenda, the EC's proposed budget appears low.
134. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1996/79 of 11 September 1979, on a Commu-
nity Support Mechanism in the Field of Data Processing, 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L
231) art. 5, at 2 (1979). Article 3 of the Regulation requires that the project must be of
"Community interest" and likely to foster development within the EC of a stronger and
more competitive European data processing industry. To qualify, the application must
come from either users in two Member States, users and undertakings in at least two
Member States, or undertakings or associations thereof, established in different Member
States. Id art. 3, at 1. Some question arose when the Regulation was issued as to
whether the aid program was intended to exclude non-European undertakings or users,
albeit established or residing in a Member State. However, given the broad application
of the freedom of establishment it is doubtful whether non-European-owned undertak-
ings could be excluded from applying for aid when they were established pursuant to the
laws of a Member State. See notes 301-09 infra and accompanying text. Given the
transnational quality of undertakings in the forefront of the data processing industry it
might be difficult to seek out and find a truly "European undertaking."
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C. THE CREATION OF NEW MARKETS AND
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
L Exploiting an Enlarged Information Market
The enlargement of the European information service market is
another goal in the Commission's general strategy. In order to
accomplish this goal, the Dublin Report states that it will be neces-
sary to gain greater access to the markets of developed non-Member
States, such as the United States, for the products of the European
information industry. 35 The Dublin Report also proposes that the
EC offer "technical, legal, commercial and financial assistance" to
projects in non-Member States that have formed associations with
the EC. 136 The Report concludes that the first step in bringing about
an enlarged infrastructure should be the extension of Euronet, a
Community-wide data communications network. 37
The Commission's proposal of October 1, 1980,138 for a Council
decision adopting a third plan of action, sets down four specific
objectives in the effort to enlarge the European information service
market. First, by December 1983 at the latest, Euronet should be
turned into a public network managed by the PTT administrations,
but under the control of and with continued cofinancing from the
Commission.1 39 The proposed plan of action also contemplates
Euronet's geographic extension to new Member States and intercon-
nection with other European networks and even networks outside
Europe.14° According to the Commission, the creation of high quali-
ty information services has fallen behind demand.141 Thus, the
plan's second objective is to promote the creation and improvement
of high quality information services,' 42 using a more refined system
of the call for proposals as its main mechanism.143 The Commission
predicts, however, that it will be able to finance, on a short term basis
only, no more than five to ten percent of the proposals. 44 These first
135. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 30.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision
Adopting a Third Three-Year Plan of Action (1981-1983) in the Field of Information
and Documentation in Science and Technology, Doc. COM (80) 552 final (1980) [herein-
after cited as Third STID Plan of Action]. See also Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 27.
139. Third STID Plan of Action, supra note 138, at 2-4.
140. Id at 2.
141. Id at 5.
142. Id at 5-9.
143. Id at 8-9. Under the call for proposals mechanism, the EC will supply part of
the cost of developing selected projects. Id at 8. The proponent of the project, however,
remains responsible for the long term viability of the project. Id
144. Id at 9.
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two objectives are given highest priority. 45
The third objective of the proposed plan of action contemplates
EC measures to support users and to promote market develop-
ment.146 The proposed plan calls for a promotional campaign
designed to draw new users to the information services of Euronet
and to bring about more intensive use by current users. 147 These
measures would also include special projects such as training facili-
ties, 48 market research,149 studies of users' selection criteria, 50
attention to the work of standardization, 5 the initial development
of a document order and delivery system for Euronet,152 and new
applications for multilingual tools.153 The final objective of the pro-
posed plan of action is to use both workshops and studies to monitor
new technological developments. 54 The workshops and studies,
together with a "strategic analysis" reflecting a consensus on new
information transfer techniques, would provide direction for EC
actions in the future.'5 s The proposed third plan of action would
have a budget of sixteen and one half million European units of
account (EUA).156 Thus, again, given the broad agenda, the pro-
posed budget appears extremely modest.
2 Software Applications and Microelectronic Technology
The Dublin Report addressed itself to two other concerns relat-
ing to the creation of new markets and industrial capacity. The
Report encouraged EC promotion of more software applications and
the harmonization of these applications throughout the EC if appro-
priate, e.g., in the area of air traffic control.' 57 Also, the Report
placed special emphasis on the role of the EC in the realm of
microelectronic technology. 58 The Report described the various
national programs as designed merely to disseminate technology.' 59
It deemed the Member States' and individual companies' uncom-
bined resources inadequate to compete with the public aid granted to
145. Id at 10.
146. Id at 10-16.
147. Id at 10.
148. Id at 11.
149. Id at 12.
150. Id at 12-13.
-151. Id at 13-14.
152. Id at 14.
153. Id at 15-16.
154. Id at 17-19.
155. Id at 18-19.
156. Id budget plan, at 2.
157. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 31-32.
158. Id at 33-35.
159. Id at 34.
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the competitors of the European microelectronics industry.160 Thus,
the EC's role is to promote long term developments in new
microelectronic technology in order to put European industry in a
competitive, perhaps leading, position by the middle of the 1980's.161
This last concern of the Dublin Report has found more concrete
expression in the Commission's proposal of September 1, 1980, for a
Council regulation concerning microelectronic technology.162
According to the Commission, the EC is overly dependent on
imports in this area, while its own production and application of
microelectronics technology lag behind that of developed non-Mem-
ber States. 163 Like the Dublin Report, the proposed regulation
would have the EC assume responsibility for ensuring European
competitiveness in this field. The proposed regulation's main objec-
tive is the development of "a capability for design and production of
competitive submicron technology circuits by 1985 ... .. 164 The
proposed regulation sets forth three means by which to reach this
goal. First, the proposal would have the Commission coordinate
current national programs for the promotion of microelectronic tech-
nology.' 65 Sec6nd, the proposed regulation would supply public
financing for up to fifty percent of the cost of research into new con-
cepts for the computer-aided design and testing of submicron tech-
nology.' 66 This research would be conducted in special projects,
usually located at universities within the EC, that would also receive
the sponsorship of interested industrial companies.167 The third and
"most urgent" proposal would promote, again with public funds, the
development of equipment for the production of microelectronic
technology and the ability to use it.168 For the moment, the neces-
sary public funds will generally come, not from the EC budget, but
160. Id
161. Id
162. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation
(EEC) Concerning Community Actions in the Field of Microelectronic Technology, Doe.
COM (80) 421 final (1980).
163. Id at 2-3.
164. Id at 6.
165. Id at 6-7. For instance, Article 3 of the proposed regulation includes a strict
requirement on the Member States with respect to such coordination: "In order to
ensure that the consultations provided for in this Regulation are effective, Member States
shall, independently of their obligations under the rules of competition, supply the Com-
mission without delay on their own initiative, or at the Commission's request, with up to
date advance information of a scientific, economic and financial nature concerning any
activities under their authority for the promotion of microelectronic technology that are
in progress... ." Id draft council regulation, art. 3.
166. Id at 7-9.
167. Id at 8-9.
168. Id at 9-11.
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from the Member States. 69 Nevertheless, the EC would exercise
some regulatory control over the financing mechanism in order to
ensure equivalent assistance in the various Member States and some
degree of uniformity in eligibility and other standards.170 This regu-
latory control would also reduce possible distortion in competition
within the EC.171
III
THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE-
AN ASSESSMENT
Europe is far behind other nations in the field of new technolo-
gies. 72 The EC's policymakers are taking a leading role in seeing to
it that Europe catches up. The Commission has devised and is now
promoting several lines of action aimed at helping Europe reach its
goals by the late 1980's.173
As discussed in Part II, the lines of action the Commission feels
are necessary include preparing society for the new technologies, cre-
ating a homogeneous market for teleinformatic goods and services,
promoting a European information sector, and creating a new indus-
trial capability. 174
In deciding on its own strategy, the Commission paid particular
attention to both the United States and Japanese experiences. 7 5 The
United States owes its world leadership position to its unified domes-
tic market, technologically integrated telecommunications network,
and massive infusions of public and private capital either in the form
of procurement or research and development.1 76 Japan's success in
the teleinformatics industries resulted from a systematic long-term
national strategy supported by both government and industry. 177
The EC, however, has neither the unified domestic market of
the United States nor the systematic long-term strategy of Japan.
Since the EC is made up often distinct national entities, any strategy
that includes voluntary structural changes must be based on a con-
sensus. It is not surprising, therefore, that the programs thus far pro-
posed by the Commission contemplate EC institutions serving as
169. Id at 15. The proposal envisages a possible refund from the EC budget to the
Member States for their costs. Id
170. Id.
171. See id at 14.
172. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 1-5.
173. Id at 6-8.
174. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
175. See notes 10-11 supra.
176. See note 10 supra.
177. See note 11 supra.
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forums for coordination rather than as bases of command. 178
A. THE POLITICAL SITUATION
To achieve its goal of the creation of a homogeneous common
market in teleinformatics goods and services, the EC must have an
integrated and dynamic telecommunications infrastructure. In this
regard, the United States is looked upon as a model.17 9 The United
States possesses an open and relatively unrestricted communications
system. 18 0 Europe, on the other hand, does not offer Community-
wide teleinformatics services or a Community-wide market for tele-
communications equipment.18'
The differences in the two approaches stem from the different
regulatory policies of Europe and the United States. 82 In the
United States, authorities have attempted to stop restrictive monopo-
listic practices in the telecommunications industry. 8 3 In Europe, the
monopolies continue, with the PTTs controlling not only the tele-
phone and telegraph systems, but extending their influence to vari-
ous other sectors of the teleinformatics market as well.9s4
The Commission, though not advocating the break-up of PTT
monopolies, seems to prefer the U.S. approach because it allows con-
sumers access to a basic communications system relatively free of
restrictions. 185 However, the Commission is not convinced that the
178. Dublin Report, supra note 1, at 13.
179. I1d at 7-8.
180. Id at 8. For a more detailed study regarding the telecommunications environ-
ment in the United States see GENERAL AcCOUNTnNc OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS,
DEVELOPING A DOMESTIC COMMON CARRIER TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: WHAT
ARE THE ISSUES, Doc. CED 79-18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
181. Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, at 2.
182. See Markoski, supra note 54, at 289-96.
183. GAO REPORT, supra note 180, at 13-14. "Within the past 20 years [the] FCC has
decided to allow competition in two previously, largely monopolized domestic telecom-
munications sectors--terminal equipment and specialized private line services (a seg-
ment of the intercity transmission sector)." Id at 13. The FCC offered several rationales
for allowing competition in these sectors. First, the public would benefit from increased
competition since it would lead to "increased technical innovation, the introduction of
new techniques and services, potentially lower costs, and increased responsiveness on the
part of existing carriers." Id at 14. Second, the FCC reasoned that specialized common
carriers that were providing private line services could be expected to satisfy demands
not met by existing carriers, and thus expand the size of the total market. Id See Hush-
a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (telephone subscribers
have a right to make reasonable use of device manufactured by petitioners for increasing
privacy of conversations and including extraneous noises); Specialized Common Carrier
Servs. Decision, 29 F.C.C.2d 890 (1971) (FCC underscored a policy favoring free entry
into the regulated industry of specialized communications service).
184. Markoski, supra note 54, at 297-305, 317-20.
185. Dublin Report, supra note I, at 8; Telecommunications Report, supra note 53, at
2-3.
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EC's political structure would allow for the implementation of a
strategy similar to that of the United States.
Several factors account for the lack of an EC political base ade-
quate to support the imposition of significant structural or policy
changes relating to the PTTs: (1) the economic and political
strength of national administrations; (2) the absence of pan-Euro-
pean producers of teleinformatic goods and services; and (3) the
ineffectiveness of EC institutions in carrying out the fundamental
objectives of the Treaty of Rome.
The Member State PTTs, which in most cases are administra-
tive arms of their respective governments, have a considerable
amount of economic and political strength. 18 6 National authorities
in the various Member States, including representatives to the Coun-
cil, cannot disregard pressure from PTTs, concerned unions, and
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment. Conceivably,
these administrations could oppose changes needed to create an inte-
grated EC teleinformatics market on the grounds that such changes
might disrupt national economies.' 8 7
A second factor contributing to the inadequate EC political base
in the teleinformatic arena is that there are presently few indigenous
pan-European manufacturers of teleinformatics equipment. Such
manufacturers would have a direct interest in the implementation of
EC reforms that remove restrictions on trade between Member
States. Large multinational manufacturers will not be likely to
extend the needed support either. These multinationals might well
prefer a Europe of fragmented markets, enabling them to continue
their market dominance. 88 EC efforts to create a unified market
186. In France, for example, the PT has become one of the country's largest inves-
tors (second only to the military). In 1978, PT investments totaled 4.6% of France's
national total. So powerful is the PTT that France's National Assembly recently issued a
report recommending that a new high-level public authority be established to take over
some of the tasks of the Direction Generale des T616communications (DGT), one of two
elements of the PTT. According to the National Assembly, the DGT's recent acquisition
of France's state transmission monopoly, T6lfusion de France, resulted in an excessive
centralization of power. See France: La tel~matique,.4n ICReport, INTER MEDIA, Jan.
1981, at 12, 14.
187. "For political, economic and technical reasons the monopolistic carrier in each
country has tended to be associated with one or more indigenous suppliers." Gill
Report, supra note 56, at 218. This association between national carriers and national
suppliers has been "a significant factor in restricting the opportunities for international
trade in this area." Id In France, the DGT is currently developing an informatics pro-
gram designed to provide an entire family of products and services capable of meeting
many market needs. The equipment contracts for this program have so far been won by
four major French companies. France: La telkmatique, An IC Report, INTER MEDIA
Jan. 1981, at 12, 15.
188. In many cases, multinationals become as "French," "German," or "Italian" as
necessary to make their market entry. Once established, the subsidiaries are able to offer
their products in local markets in competition with indigenous manufacturers. The corn-
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would do little to expand the business of the multinational, and may
be perceived by certain multinationals as disadvantageous in the
long run. 89
The third factor responsible for the EC's inadequate political
base is that the EC institutions have too often been ineffective in
carrying out the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The Council of
Ministers has felt compelled to reach unanimous decisions on impor-
tant EC policy objectives, often vitiating fundamental Treaty objec-
tives in the process.190 Moreover, a whole series of specialized
councils has been established, and when matters of importance such
as agriculture, energy, monetary policy, or telecommunications come
up, the foreign ministers often defer to national specialized
experts.1 91 As a result, solutions tend to be based on national com-
promises. Finally, the Commission, though endowed with the power
to propose the legislation necessary to carry out EC objectives,192
generally uses its powers "frugally," putting forward only those pro-
posals that are likely to be unanimously accepted by Member
States.1 93
The remainJer of this Article will evaluate the Commission's
teleinformatics strategy in the context of the above realities, and
attempt to show that the Commission has perhaps been overly cau-
tious in utilizing its potential legal authority to promulgate more
aggressive programs or initiate particular enforcement actions for
carrying out its overall teleinformatics strategy.
B. THE LEGAL BASE
The thrust of the EC's teleinformatics strategy conforms with
the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome, as stated in Article 2: "to
petitive advantage of the multinational is due to the fact that multinationals may spread
research and development costs across a world market, whereas local European manu-
facturers have a smaller market over which to spread such costs. See generally Gill
Report, supra note 56, at 219-22.
189. This observation would not be true for certain teleinformatics services suppliers,
such as Control Data Corporation or Automatic Data Processing Corporation (ADP),
which, due to the transnational character of their offerings, do best in a European market
with fewer barriers and restrictions.
190. Criis in EC Institutions, EUROPE, Mar. - April 1981, at 22 [hereinafter cited as
Thorn Interview]. EC Commission President Gaston Thorn gave his views on what
should be done to solve the crisis in the EC's institutions in this interview with EUROPE
magazine.
191. Id at 23.
192. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 189.
193. The EC Commission President noted:
It is clearly laid down in the Treaty that only the Commission has the power to
propose legislation. Yet over the past few years, it has used these powers fru-
gally. I agree that its motivation has been laudable--only to put forward propos-
als likely to be accepted by member states.
Thorn Interview, supra note 190, at 24.
EUROPEAN STRA4TEGY
promote throughout the EC a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in sta-
bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer rela-
tions between the States belonging to it."194 Furthermore, the EC
may rely upon the implementation rules of Article 3 to create a com-
mon market as a method of achieving its teleinformatics strategy.1 95
The rules include: abolishing restrictions on the free movement of
goods (Articles 9-37), persons (Articles 48-58), services (Articles 59-
66), and capital (Articles 67-73); removing restrictions or conditions
affecting competition (Articles 85-94); and harmonizing legal provi-
sions and administrative rules affecting the establishment and func-
tioning of the common market (Articles 100-102).196
The Commission could employ the common market rules of
Article 3 in one of two ways: either as a legal base for Community-
wide legislation,1 97 or as a mechanism through which to undertake
selective regulation against Member States and specific private or
public enterprises.198 Thus far in the teleinformatics field, the Com-
mission has not chosen to exploit its authority to issue Community-
wide legislation, relying instead upon Article 235 for the proposition
that the Treaty of Rome has not provided the necessary powers with
which the EC can enter the field, and that therefore unanimous
Council consent is needed before action can be taken.199 The second
194. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 2.
195. Id art. 3.
196. Treaty of Rome, note 3 supra.
197. The primary decisionmaking powers regarding legislation rest with the Council.
When the establishment of a common market calls for legislation, it is generally the
Council that responds by issuing necessary regulations and directives. The Commission
also has the authority to issue such legislation, but it usually exercises this authority only
on the basis of individual cases. The Commission's most important role in the legislative
area is in proposing legislation to the Council. The degree to which the Council will
promulgate legislation to deal with particular problems or Treaty objectives becomes a
function of the Commission's resolve to put the proposals before it. See general, P.
MATHI sEN, supra note 3, at 137.
198. The Commission may impose fines, or, in certain circumstances, request specific
performance. The Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 89, gives the Commission the
authority to investigate competition infringements and take appropriate measures to
bring them to an end. If the Treaty does not specifically provide a mechanism to achieve
a Treaty objective, the Commission may resort to use of Article 235. See note 199 infra.
199. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to obtain in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
Id art. 235. The powers granted in Article 235 are subsidiary in nature and are to be
used in instances in which the Treaty has not granted powers necessary for the achieve-
ment of an EC objective. In the last few years, Article 235 has been resorted with
increasing frequency. See 5 H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN ECO-
NOMIC COMMUNrIY 6-280 to 281 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SMrr & HERZOG]. How-
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mdthod, selective regulatory action, involves less risk of coordinated
Member State opposition which could potentially operate to keep
the Commission out of the field.
What follows is a brief examination of those Treaty rules that
the Commission could possibly employ to expand its teleinformatics
strategy, and a discussion of how the rules might be applied to spe-
cific problem areas.
L Restrictions Against the Free Movement of Goods
A fundamental ingredient in the creation of the common mar-
ket is the elimination of all obstacles to the free flow of goods
between Member States.200 Duties, traditionally viewed as the prime
barriers to trade, are not the only obstacles the Treaty addresses. In
Articles 30-37, the Treaty addresses the phenomenon of "quantita-
tive restrictions" 20' as well. These latter Articles are particularly rel-
evant to the EC's strategy for the import and export of teleinformatic
products.202
Articles 30297 prohibit not only quantitative restrictions, but
"all measures having equivalent effect." 203 The Court of Justice has
interpreted this concept broadly, and it has been employed to pro-
hibit such measures as: Member State trading rules that are capable
of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade;2(4 excessive procedural formalities imposed upon
importers; 205 requirements that manufacturers of certain products
utilize products originating in the country of manufacture; 20 meas-
ures requiring an importer to purchase or sell a specified quantity of
nationally produced products in order to be eligible for an import
ever, because Article 235 requires unanimous Council action, it is generally used only in
matters of strong political consensus among the Member States.
200. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 3. Article 3(a) provides for the "elimination,
as between Member States, of custom duties and of quantitative restrictions on the
import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect." Id
201. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 30-37.
202. See notes 200-19 infra and accompanying text.
203. Article 30 provides: "Quantitative Restrictions on imports and all measures hav-
ing equivalent effeci shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited
between Member States." Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 30 (emphasis added). Arti-
cle 34(l) contains the same prohibitions with respect to exports. 1a art. 34.
204. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, [1974] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 436.
205. Int'l Fruit Co. v. Produckstschap, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1107, [1971] CoMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8158. In InternationalFruit, the "Court of Justice indicated, though
it did not have to deal directly with [the] point, that the requirement of any import
license for intra-Community trade would violate Article 30." See I SMIT & HERZOG,
supra note 199, at 2-128.
206. Rbglement No. 175/66/CEE de la Commission, 9 .0. CoMM. EuR. 3487 (1966).
See also I SMIT & HERzoG, supra note 199, at 2-128.
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license;207 and measures that establish a minimum price for imports
or exports.208 Hence, the quantitative restriction equivalency con-
cept has been interpreted broadly; some authority even exists for the
proposition that rules of administrative practice having a restrictive
effect on trade may constitute a violation of Article 30, even if no
actual impact on trade is shown.20 9 In view of the liberal construc-
tion given to the quantitative restriction provisions, the Commission
should pay particular attention to several concerns that the Dublin
Report raised with respect to the PTTs' public procurement practices
and type approval restrictions on equipment.
The procurement policies of national telecommunications
administrations have effectively been excluded from the EC's policy
reforms in the area. While some sectors of the teleinformatics indus-
tries, such as data processing equipment and services, are currently
protected by EC directives, the PTT's have been permitted to con-
tinue discriminatory "buy-French," "buy-German," or "buy-Ital-
ian" policies that may be in contravention of Article 30. The
Council does have the legal authority to remedy the situation; a 1976
Council Directive specifically states that "restrictions on the free
movement of goods in respect of public supplies are prohibited by
the terms of Articles 30 et seq. of the Treaty."210 However, given the
political considerations discussed earlier,211 it is doubtful that the
PTTs would react favorably to an EC attempt to expand this Council
Directive.
Several PTTs within the EC place restrictions on what equip-
ment may be placed on the basic phone system. These restrictions
range from outright prohibitions of any interconnect equipment not
made within the concerned Member State, to type approval arrange-
ments and equipment registration procedures. 212 Since these prac-
207. See note 206.
208. See 1 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 2-129.
209. Id. The French Council of State, however, has held that an actual impact on
imports must be shown before there can be a measure equivalent to a quantitative restric-
tion. Id.
210. Council Directive of 21 December 1976, Coordinating Procedures for the Award
of Public Supply Contracts, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 13) 1 (1977). While noting that
public contracting procedures are within the scope of Article 30, the Council also relied
on Article 100 as a basis for entering the field. Id. See also Council Directive of 26 July
1971, 14 J.. COMM. EUR. (No. L 185) (1971) (directive enacted pursuant to Article 100).
211. See notes 179-93 supra and accompanying text.
212. For example, in Germany, interconnection with the basic phone system is
authorized only if the interface equipment is German-made or German-registered (Ze.,
"approved"). As a result of stiff regulations and approval requirements, a non-German-
based supplier of data services is limited in its choice of equipment, irrespective of the
desirability of the approved equipment from a cost or design perspective.
This situation is in sharp contrast to that found in the United States, where one may
interconnect the communications network after going through a relatively easy certifica-
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tices are capable of obstructing the free flow of goods, the
Commission should be particularly concerned with investigating
them. The Commission could easily inquire into such practices
based on Article 30, especially in light of State v. Sacchi213 where the
Court of Justice found Italian Radio and Television practices, which
amounted to no more than expounding a "buy-Italian" policy on a
public television broadcast, suspect.214
The Member States could possibly advance two defenses to a
Commission charge of applying measures equivalent to quantitative
restrictions. First, Article 35 provides that Member States will abol-
ish quantitative restrictions more rapidly than provided for in the
Treaty only if their "general economic situation and the situation of
the economic sector concerned so permit."215 Second, Article 36
allows Member States to place restrictions on "imports, exports or
goods in transit.., on grounds of public morality, public policy or
public security; ... or the protection of industrial and commercial
property."216 Imports or exports of legitimate concern under this
Article might include access equipment for national security data
storage systems br encrypting devices for national security communi-
cations systems. Note that Article 36 advances the caveat that the
restrictions exempted from control therein should not "constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
tion process. Certification will be refused only if the accessing equipment will harm the
network.
213. State v. Sacchi, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177 (1974).
214. Id
215. Article 35 provides: "The Member States declare their readiness to abolish quan-
titative restrictions on imports from and exports to other Member States more rapidly
than is provided for in the preceding Articles, if their general economic situation and the
situation of the economic sector concerned so permit." Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art.
35 (emphasis added). Without a Community-mandated timetable for the elimination of
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions, Article 35 leaves it to
the individual states concerned to decide whether their economic situations, or the eco-
nomic sector concerned, enable them to eliminate the restrictions unilaterally. However,
Article 33(7) authorizes the Commission to enact directives providing timetables and
procedures for the elimination of such restrictions. Id art. 33(7).
216. Id art. 36. The term "public policy" is susceptible to differing interpretations.
"In its narrowest sense, [public policy] refers to the avoidance of disturbances affecting
law and order and includes the maintenance of national security." 2 SMrr & HERZOo,
supra note 199, at 2-616 to 617. In a broader sense, public policy refers to "public
good"-a concept that "comprises all basic (and not only essential) principles of the ethi-
cal, political alnd economic order of the State." Id at 2-617. The broader construction
probably best expresses the concept of "public policy" within the meaning of Article 36.
Id
The concept of public policy may be particularly difficult to define in the economic
area. "Most states view the achievement of certain economic goals as one of the main
purposes of their state policy. . . . In some situations, these [goals] could possibly be
jeopardized by the establishment of non-nationals on the territory of the State con-
cerned." Id at 2-618.
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between Member States." 217
Thus far the EC's teleinformatics strategists have not chosen to
challenge such restrictive national import practices in light of Article
30, taking a more cautious approach instead, and merely inviting the
PTTs of Member States to buy each other's equipment.218 If the
Commission does not choose to address the problem with Commu-
nity-wide legislation, it might choose instead to make inquiries into
only those situations involving particularly abusive practices. Selec-
tive application of Articles 30-37 is better than no application at all.
If the Commission chooses to take no action, perhaps an adversely
affected European manufacturer or supplier of teleinformatics
equipment could bring a complaint in the appropriate legal
forum.
2 19
2. Restrictions Against the Free Movement of Workers, the Right of
Establishment, and the Freedom to Supply Services
In addition to the free movement of goods, the Treaty also pro-
vides for the free movement of workers, 220 the right of establish-
ment,221 and the freedom to supply services.222 The Commission
ought to consider these freedoms in planning its teleinformatics pro-
gram since necessary to any successful strategy is an environment in
which workers are adequately equipped and free to participate in the
development of new technologies; 223 new technology-related indus-
tries are free to establish where they choose;224 and teleinformatics
professionals and technical experts are free to provide their services
in the Member State of their choice.22
a. Workers
In order to bring about the free movement of workers, Member
States are called upon to abolish discrimination between workers of
the various Member States as regards "employment, remuneration
and other conditions of work and employment. ' 226 Article 48 estab-
lishes the worker's right, subject to concerns of public order, public
217. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 36.
218. See notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of the ability of individuals to bring suits under Articles 30-37,
see S.P.A. Salgoil v. Italian Foreign Trade Ministry, [1968] CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 661,
[1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 181.
220. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 48-51.
221. Id arts. 52-58.
222. Id arts. 59-66.
223. See notes 226-30 infra and accompanying text.
224. See notes 231-38 infra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 239-46 infra and accompanying text.
226. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 48.
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safety and public health, to accept offers of employment and move
freely within the Member States for such purposes, remain employed
in Member States on the same basis as nationals of that country, and
remain in the Member State after having been employed there.227
Article 50 provides that "Member States shall, within the frame-
work of a joint programme, encourage the exchange of young work-
ers." 228 The purposes of Article 50, according to some experts, are
different from those found in Articles 48-49, which aim at freeing the
movement of labor.2 2 9 Article 50 purposes are educational and cul-
tural, and include such goals as improving vocational training
opportunities and enabling young people to become acquainted with
other countries within the EC.230
Thus far, the Commission has not discussed the possible appli-
cation of Treaty rules relating to the free movement of workers to its
strategy for teleinformatics. Articles 48-51 pro'vide a base upon
which the Commission could promote and assist in coordinating
Member State programs aimed at preparing the current work force
as well as a new generation of workers for jobs in the field of the new
technologies. 9uch programs might encourage Member States to
offer common vocational and technical courses related to the new
technologies.
b. Establishment
The right of establishment231 includes "the right to take up and
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage
undertakings" in a Member State under the same conditions laid
down for that Member State's own nationals.232 The Council and
Commission are required to carry out the duties established in Arti-
cles 52-53 by various measures, including the abolition of national
procedures and practices, "the maintenance of which would form an
obstacle to freedom of establishment." 233
227. Id art. 48(3)(a)-(d). Article 49 gives the Council authority to issue directives and
regulations setting out measures aimed at bringing about the free movement of workers.
Id art. 49. Through its Article 49 regulatory authority, the Council could issue direc-
tives or regulations necessary to remove restrictions that inhibit workers in the high tech-
nology area from moving freely within the EC. See notes 226-30 infra and
accompanying text.
228. Id art. 500.
229. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 48-49.
230. In order to increase the mobility of young workers, the Advisory Committee for
vocational training in 1977 adopted guidelines aimed at making training consistent
throughout the EC. 11 Eu. CoMM. COMM'N GEN. REP. 123 (1977). The Commission's
teleinformatics strategists could possibly follow through with these earlier initiatives.
231. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 52-58.
232. Id art. 52.
233. Id art. 54(3)(c). Note that Article 56(1) makes the provisions on the right of
establishment inapplicable to national measures containing discriminatory provisions
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The right of establishment has been interpreted broadly to
include "industry, commerce, finance, agriculture, public works,
crafts and the professions."234 Furthermore, the right of establish-
ment covers not only the performance of activities themselves, but
collateral acts such as setting up agencies, branches, or subsidiaries
to form companies and acquire ownership in existing frms.235 Per-
sons benefiting from the right of establishment include legal as well
as natural persons.
To be entitled to treatment as natural persons, companies or
firms must be "formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State," and have their "registered office, central administration, or
principal place of business within the Community." 236 Thus, a
wholly foreign-owned, non-EC company may set up a subsidiary in
the EC in accordance with the law of a Member State and be entitled
to the right to establish anywhere in the EC, provided it has a regis-
tered office, its central administration, or a principal place of busi-
ness within any state.237 Once established, the subsidiary is free to
conduct its business in any Member State, even if the state has
restrictions against the establishment of foreign-controlled
companies.
The Commission is not likely to rely upon articles 52-58 when
formulating or implementing Community-wide teleinformatics pro-
grams. However, the right of establishment provisions may prove to
be useful if a Member State promulgates restrictive laws or regula-
tions that have the effect of excluding other Member State enter-
prises from entering one or another section of its teleinformatics
market.238
promulgated on grounds of public policy. Id art. 56(1). See note 216 supra for a discus-
sion of "public policy" as it relates to quantitative restrictions.
234. See 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 2-538 to 540.
235. Id at 2-539.
236. Article 98 provides:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of busi-
ness within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in
the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 58. See generalv 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199,
at 2-637 to 648.
237. 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 2-637 to 648.
238. In situations where a Community-based data processing enterprise is refused
entry into another Member State on grounds of "public policy," the Commission should
take action to investigate. Since such refusals could fragment the EC's data processing
market, the Commission should be particularly concerned with determining whether the
Member State's "public policy" justification is legitimate. Individuals, as well, have the
power to bring actions before national courts to claim the advantages of free establish-
ment. For a discussion of the self-executing nature of Article 52, see id at 2-543 to 544.
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c., Services
The abolition of obstacles to the free movement of services is
another objective of the Treaty of Rome.2 9 By ensuring the equal
treatment of residents and nonresidents,240 the Treaty's chapter on
services24' protects the economic activities of EC nationals who wish
to provide services within other Member States. The Treaty rules on
services, together with the rules on workers and establishment, sup-
plement the common market in goods by allowing EC residents to
perform their activities on a Community-wide basis.242 Article 59,
which requires that restrictions on the freedom to provide services be
abolished, has been construed broadly.243 The services Articles 59-
66 protects include professional, commercial and industrial services,
and the activities of craftsmen.2 "
EC authorities interested in achieving a common market for
teleinformatics services may wish to inquire into those legislative or
regulatory measures that, to varying degrees, have a restrictive effect
on the provision of intra-Community services, such as privacy data
protection laws24 5 and transnational data processing laws. The EC
interest here lies not in challenging the authority of Member States
to promulgate such legislation, but in ensuring that the legislation
239. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 3(c), 59-66.
240. Id art. 59.
241. Id arts. 59-66.
242. The free movement of services may be distinguished from free establishment in
that the latter implies the creation of at least a temporary plant or office, whereas the
former does not. Movement of services, in turn, is distinguishable from free movement
of labor in that the former implies activities by independent contractors while the latter
implies activities by an employed person. See 2 SMrT & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 2-
649.
243. The General Programme for the Abolition of Restrictions on the Freedom to
Provide Services, 5 J.0. COMM. EUR. 32 (1962) [hereinafter cited as General Pro-
gramme], indicates that restrictions against the movement of services includes regulations
that although applicable to residents or non-residents, in fact restrict exclusively or
predominantly the furnishing of services of non-residents. 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note
199, at 2-654. The General Programme "also provides that not only discriminations
resulting from formal enactments, but also those resulting from the implementation of
such enactments or from mere administrative practices, are subject to elimination." Id
at 2-655. While the General Programme deals only with acts of a Member State, the
Court of Justice has extended the prohibitions to acts of private parties. Id
244. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 60. According to the Court of Justice in State
v. Sacchi, 11974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177 (1974), television
broadcasting is also a service, and thus is covered by the Treaty rules on services. On the
other hand, the rules on goods would cover trading in broadcasting equipment. See 2
SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 2-661.
Subdivision (C) of Title III of the General Programme, note 243 supra, requires the
abolition of "any prohibition on or impairment of the financial means necessary for the
carrying out of the services." Id This prohibition might apply to practices in those
Member States exercising strict foreign exchange controls. See 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra
note 199, at 2-655.
245. See notes 36-49 supra and accompanying text.
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does not unduly frustrate basic treaty objectives. Thus, the Treaty
chapter on services may lend itself to Commission involvement on a
case-by-case basis in relevant judicial forums or as a mechanism for
initiating programs having Community-wide applicability.246
3. The Treaty Rules on Competition
A free and open European market in teleinformatic goods and
services is a central element in the EC's strategy to meet the chal-
lenge of the new technologies. The Treaty's rules on competition 247
provide a legal basis for promulgating Community-wide legislation
to remove existing barriers to a homogeneous teleinformatics market
or regulating against those undertakings, both public and private,
that participate in anticompetitive activities or practices.
Many of the Commission's proposed recommendations in the
teleinformatics area revolve around problems created by Member
State PTTs, such as divcrgent procurement policies and technical
standards. While the Commission will undoubtedly continue its
investigations into alleged abuses by private undertakings in the high
technology area, future inquiries may begin to focus on the activities
of public undertakings.
a. Article 90 Restrictions on Public Undertakings
Article 90 provides that public enterprise and enterprises to
which Member States grant exclusive or special rights are subject to
all the Treaty rules, particularly the rules on competition.248 If a
public enterprise violates a rule of the Treaty, the Commission may
take appropriate action against the violating Member State by issu-
ing directives or decisions.249
By prohibiting Member States from enacting or maintaining in
force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty,
246. For a discussion of the self-executing nature of Article 59, see 2 SMIT & HERZOG,
supra note 199, at 2-658.
247. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 85-94.
248. Article 90(1) provides:
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 90(1).
249. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 90(3). The authority given to the Commission
by Article 90(3) does not deprive the Commission of any other enforcement authority
that it may have by virtue of other provisions. For example, pursuant to Council Regula-
tion 17/62, 1962 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 [hereinafter cited as Regulation 17/62], the Com-
mission may levy fines or penalties against a Member State for violations by an
enterprise that is controlled by the State. Regulation 17/62 implements Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty. See also 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-364.
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Article 90 in effect assures that Member States will not secure for
state-controlled enterprises benefits that private enterprises could not
obtain without violating the Treaty.250 Article 90 must be broadly
construed, moreover, since it represents the very purpose of the
Treaty: to prevent Member States from achieving unfair advantages
to the detriment of the Treaty's fundamental objective of creating a
common market.25'
Article 90(2) provides an exception for "undertakings entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest or having
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly."252 These under-
takings are subject to the Treaty rules (Article 90(1)) only to the
extent that "the application of such rules does not obstruct the per-
formance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to
them." 253 However, the exception is lost if the development of trade
is affected to "such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of
the Community." 4 Because Article 90(2) provides an exception to
the application of all Treaty rules, including those considered essen-
tial for the creation of a common market, it should be narrowly
construed.255  %
If a public enterprise does violate a Treaty rule, and does not
fall within the Article 90(2) exception, the Article 90(1) prohibition
will be unqualified and unconditional, needing no further imple-
mentation at the national level. 56
Article 90(1) prohibits Member States and their undertakings
from taking measures contrary to any Treaty rule.257 The proscrip-
tion of Article 90(1), therefore, is relevant not only to the enforce-
ment of the rules on competition, but also to other mechanisms
250. In NV GB-INNO-BM v. Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Tabak, [1977] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2115, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283 (1978), the Court of Justice adopted
the general principle that Member States cannot give any enterprise the unfair advan-
tages prohibited by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. Id at 2123-24,21 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
216-17.
251. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 2, 3.
252. Id art. 90(2).
253. Id The purpose of the Article 90(2) exception is to permit Member States to
assign the provision of general services to enterprises of their own choosing, but not at
the expense of fundamental EC objectives. Article 90(2) represents a compromise
between the subjection of such undertakings to the full force of the Treaty rules and
excluding them altogether. See 3 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-359.
254. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 90(2).
255. 3 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-346.
256. "Not only may a Member State not introduce any new measure, it must immedi-
ately abrogate any that are already in existence." 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 199, at
3-345. The fact that Article 90(1) "imposes an obligation on Member States does not
exclude the possibility of its creating direct rights in the citizens of the Member States."
Id
257. Treaty of Rome, srupra note 3, art. 90(l).
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designed to regulate or control activity that violates the Treaty, such
as the free flow of goods and the right of establishment provisions.
The broad scope given Article 90(1), together with the narrowly
construed Article 90(2) exception, indicates that there is little basis
for excluding the activities of Member State PTTs and other public
entities from the application of Article 9.258 If the PTTs and other
public entities are within the scope of the Treaty, the following three
categories of anticompetitive practices prohibited by the Treaty's
rules on competition will be relevant to the success of any EC
teleinformatics strategy: (1) agreements between undertakings that
affect trade and distort competition;259 (2) abuses of a dominant
position within the common market; and260 (3) Member State aid
schemes that favor national industries.26'
b. Agreements Which Affect Trade or Distort Competition
Article 85 bans all agreements between enterprises which "may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market. '262 Agreements falling within the
prohibitions of Article 85(1) are automatically void.263 However,
agreements may be exempted from Article 85(l)'s strict application
under the conditions set forth in Article 85(3).26
258. See Thompson, Challenging CEPTAgreements, TELEPHONY, Jan. 26, 1981, at 68.
[hereinafter cited as TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2]. Thompson's article includes an interro-
gatory of the English Queen's counsel who has made a "special study" on the Treaty and
its applicability to the activities of PTTs. The British expert responded in the affirmative
to the question: "Are the PTTs who within the Common Market are either government
departments, or separate statutory corporations, subject to the provisions of Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome pursuant to 4rticle 90 of the Treaty?" Id at 69 (emphasis
added).
259. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 85.
260. Id art. 86.
261. Id arts. 92-94.
262. Id art. 85(l). Article 85 prohibitions apply to "all agreements between undertak-
ings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices." Id Activities
prohibited under Article 85 include: price fixing; limiting or controlling production, mar-
kets, technical development, or investment; market sharing; applying dissimilar condi-
tions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties; and requiring the conclusion
of contracts to be subject to the acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obliga-
tions having no connection with the subject of the contracts. Id art. 85(1)(a)-(e). For an
extended discussion of the meaning and application of Article 85, see Gijlstra & Murphy,
EEC Competition Law 4fer the Brasserie de Haecht I and S4B4M Cases, 2 LEGAL
IssuEs OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 79 (1974).
263. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 85(2).
264. To qualify for exemption under Article 85(3), agreements must meet two positive
and two negative conditions. The positive conditions are:
(a) the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution
of goods or promoting technical or economic progress; and
19811
276 COVRNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:237
The rules for prohibiting agreements under Article 85 or
exempting them from its application are set out in Regulation 17/62
of the Council of the EEC.265 If an agreement does not qualify for
exemption under Article 85(3), the enterprise involved will be sub-
ject to fines, penalties, or other necessary remedial measures. 266 The
Commission is also empowered to issue injunctive relief by requiring
the wrongdoing enterprise to put an end to the prohibited activi-
ties.267 When read together with Article 90, Article 85 enables the
Commission to issue appropriate directives and decisions to the
Member States.268
So far, the Commission's interest in the applicability of the rules
on competition to its teleinformatics strategy has centered upon
those PTT practices that favor national manufacturers. The EC
strategists have paid little attention to agreements between PTTs
themselves. These agreements, made within the confines of the
CEPT,269 relate, inter alia, to communication tariffs, conditions
affecting the use of leased circuits, and the structure of international
data networks.
To the extent that agreements between PTTs affect trade
between two or more Member States and have as their object or
effect the prevention, destruction, or distortion of competition within
the EC, the Commission, on its own or on the basis of a complaint
filed by an adversely affected party, should be able to make inquiries
and take appropriate remedial actions.270 However, the Commission
has thus far received little incentive to make such inquiries. In addi-
tion to certain political realities,271 this hesitancy may be due to the
(b) the agreement must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits
from such improvements or progress.
The two negative conditions are:
(a) the arrangement must not impose any restrictions unless they are indispen-
sable to the achievement of the above objectives; and
(b) the agreement must not enable the undertakings involved to eliminate com-
petition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id art. 85(3). TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, supra note 258, at 68.
265. Regulation 17/62, note 249 supra. The Regulation requires that the Commission
be notified of any agreements referred to in Article 85(1) that have come into being after
Regulation 17/62 was entered into force for which those concerned wish to invoke Arti-
cle 85(3). An agreement that contravenes Article 85(1) remains null and void until an
injured party, or any party to the agreement notifies the Commission. After the Commis-
sion is notified, the agreement is deemed valid until the Commission makes a ruling on it.
See Thompson, Treaty Violations by the European P7Ts?, TELEPHONY, Dec. 22, 1980, at
64.
266. See Regulation 17/62, note 249 supra.
267. See note 249 supra.
268. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 85, 90.
269. See note 55 supra.
270. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 89(1).
271. See notes 179-93 supra.
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fact that the PTTs defenses have not yet been judicially tested.
Before challenging the PTTs, the Commission would probably
require a thorough economic analysis of the effect of the PTTs on the
common market, as well as an assessment of the likelihood that the
PTTs would qualify for an exception from the Treaty rules under
Article 85(3).272
If put under Article 85 scrutiny, PTTs might argue for an Arti-
cle 85(3) exception on the grounds that their agreements: (1) are
absolutely necessary for survival in an environment of technically
diverse communications systems; (2) represent the only progress that
has been made in intra-European communications, and as such have
served to benefit the consumer; (3) contain only those conditions
that are indispensable to the attainment of European communica-
tions objectives; and (4) do not eliminate competition. Since each
PTT exists as a monopoly in a particular Member State, there can be
no lessening of a nonexistent competition.273
Examples of agreements that might be the focus of Commission
action are those concerning the routing of circuits through certain
Member States to the exclusion of others, setting inordinately high
tariffs for leased circuits crossing national boundaries, imposing vol-
ume sensitive pricing, or setting rates based primarily on the value of
the service to the user.274 All of these agreements in varying degrees
distort competition in vital segments of the EC's teleinformatics mar-
ket. In particular, they limit the number of business choices avail-
able to data service providers.275 Agreements resulting in such
competition restrictions, and which are not necessary to provide
basic service to customers of the PTTs, may provide the Commission
with its first opportunity to make Article 85 inquiries concerning
teleinformatics.
272. The Commission would first determine whether agreements made among the
PTTs (such as those found in the confines of CEPT) affect trade between at least two
Member States. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 85(1). Since commerce among
Member States has become increasingly dependent upon the structure of the various
Member State communications networks, there are few industries whose trade would not
be affected by restrictive agreements among PTTs. For a discussion of the interpreta-
tion of "affect" in Article 85(l), see 2 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-100 to 117.
Next, the Commission would determine whether the agreements have as their object or
consequence the restriction, distortion, or prevention of competition within the common
market. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 85(l). See generally 2 SMIT & HERZOG, supra
note 199, at 3-117 to 125.
273. See generally TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, note 258 supra. Since the burden is on the
Commission to establish an infringement, the PTTs would be in a defensive position.
274. Id at 70. See also Gill Report, supra note 56, at 215-17.
275. Providers of services may be forced to redesign networks in order to avoid unrea-
sonably high tariffs, including the placement of processing computers in a Member State
with the lowest communications costs. This in turn may have a ripple effect, requiring
the data service provider to purchase specialized equipment made in the host country.
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c. ' Abuse of a Dominant Position
Article 86 prohibits any abuse "of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it. . . insofar as [that
abuse] may affect trade between Member States. '276 Since Article 86
prohibits any "abuses of a dominant position,"277 it operates not
only against monopolies per se, but also provides for the control of
oligopolistic market situations.278 However, because it operates only
against an abuse that may potentially affect trade between Member
States, it does not make all dominant positions illegal per se.279 The
concept of abuse is further illustrated by the examples of abuses
listed in Article 86:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of slupplementary obligations which, by their nature or accord-
ing to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts. 2
80
This list is not exhaustive. The objective of the establishment of a
common market and the general purpose provisions of the Preamble
and Articles 2 and 3 may also provide the basis for a Commission
276. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 86. For materials on Article 86 generally, see
Jones, A Primer on Production and Dominant Positions Under E.E.C Competition Law, 7
INT'L LAW. 612 (1973); Korah, Interpretation and Application ofArticle 86 of the Treaty of
Rome: Abuse of a Dominant Position within the Common Market, 53 NOTRE DAME L.
768 (1977/78); Ramsey, In Support of the Treaty's 'Fundamental Objectives" 4 Survey of
Recent Developments Concerning the Interpretation of an Abuse of Dominant Position
under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, I LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1
(1975).
277. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 86. In defining the concept of an abuse or
improper exploitation of a dominant position, the Commission stated:
There is said to be improper exploitation when the conduct of an enterprise
objectively constitutes a deviation from the objectives that have been settled by
the Treaty. The improper practices of a dominant enterprise may exist vis-A-vis
present competitors, potential competitors or with regard to suppliers and cus-
tomers. As there is no general definition of an improper exploitation, its exist-
ence must be decided upon each case in the light of the objectives of the relevant
EEC legislation.
Memorandum of Concentration within the Common Market of Dec. 1, 1965, as cited in
Ramsey, supra note 276, at 4.
278. See A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAw 302 (1973).
279. Id Three conditions must be met before the Article 86 prohibition can be
invoked: (a) a dominant position must exist; (b) that position must be abused; (c) there
must be a possibility that trade between Member States may be affected by the abuse.
Id at 302-07.
280. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 86(a)-(d).
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finding of abuse. 281 The Court has found abuses by undertakings in
a dominant position to include the charging of excessively high
prices,282 the misuse of a copyright,283 and the intended merger
between a dominant manufacturer of metal containers and a smaller,
yet important, competitor.28 4
Some authorities have questioned whether certain PTT agree-
ments and recommendations made within CEPT might come within
the purview of Article 86 prohibitions.285 For example, the PTTs,
which are undertakings in dominant positions, have participated
through CEPT in "restrictive or punitive practices. ' 286 Practices
questioned include: maintaining excessively high tariffs for leased
circuits crossing national frontiers; prohibiting use of customer-
owned or customer-provided terminal equipment; maintaining artifi-
cially higher charges than are required of a PTT if operating in a
competitive economy; and, imposing on customers "all use" tariff
categories as well as requiring additional volume sensitive charges
where a leased circuit is used by more than one entity.287 Restrictive
practices or policies feared but not yet on the scene include PTT
intentions to use "value of service to customer" as the dominant fac-
tor in fixing rates and to "absorb all private use networks into public
networks. ' 288 Agreements or policies placing restrictions on compe-
tition by imposing unfair rate structures or unreasonable use restric-
tions on telecommunication services deserve special attention when
discussing the applicability of Article 86.
(1). Unfair Rate Structures: The SWIFT Experience
The experience of the Society of Worldwide Financial Telecom-
munications (SWIFT) with the European PTTs illustrates the unfair
rate structure problem. When SWIFT decided to develop its own
international telecommunications network to serve the worldwide
banking community it met with the first major effort by European
281. Id preamble, arts. 2, 3. See, eg., Europhemballage Corporation and Continen-
tal Can Company Inc. v. Commission of the European Communities, [1973] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 199 (1973) (the Court found that an "abuse" under
Article 86 includes an obstruction of Article 3(f) goals).
282. See, eg., Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69, 10 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 260 (1971).
283. See, eg., Belgische Radio en Televisie v. S.A.B.A.M., [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 313, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238 (1974).
284. See, ag., Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v.
Commission of the European Communities, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 199 (1973).
285. TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, supra note 258, at 70.
286. Id These practices might also be the focus of Commission action under Article
85. See text accompanying note 274 supra.
287. Id
288. Id
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PTTs to curtail the use of private networks. 289 SWIFT is not the first
to devise such a network, however. The Soci6t6 Internationale des
T6lcommunications Aeronautiques (SITA) has been operating a
similar network utilizing privately leased circuits since 1959. The
arrangement gives SITA unlimited access to privately leased circuits
at flat monthly rates in conformity with CCITT recom-
mendations. 290
Concerned with the potential loss of telex revenues, the various
PTTs, acting through the CEPT organization, concluded that
SWIFT's proposal for an arrangement similar to SITA's could be
granted only if it were altered by computing SWIFT's circuit costs
on the basis of both a flat rate and a per message element.291
Although it appears that SWIFT and CEPT have resolved the
disagreement over the proposed rate structure, the implications of
CEPT's original proposal remain troublesome. Essentially, CEPT
put SWIFT in a take-it-or-leave-it position, whereby SWIFT had to
either pay a volume sensitive surcharge or lose access to privately
leased lines. 292 While it has been reported that SWIFT did, in fact,
'file a complaint vith the Commission, reports of any official inquir-
ies apparently have not been released to the public.293
From an Article 86 perspective, it appears that CEPT, in its
dealings with SWIFT, attempted not only to impose unfair prices,
but also to apply unequal conditions to like parties in like transac-
tions. 294 In the face of a complaint, it is likely that the CEPT would
289. By using volume insensitive circuits, leased from various public administrations,
SWIFT hoped to be in a position to control access to its own network as well as to realize
substantial savings over the use of then existing public services. See Markoski, supra
note 54, at 298-99.
290. TELEPHONY AmTiCLE 2, supra note 258, at 73.
291. Markoski, supra note 54, at 299. Markoski suggests that the CEPT counterpro-
posal would substantially increase the cost of using SWIFT to a degree that it would
threaten "the economic viability of the SWIFT network even before it began opera-
tions." Id
292. TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, supra note 258, at 73.
293. Id at 70.
294. Article 86 prohibits unfair prices as well as price discrimination. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 3, art. 86(a). In United Brands Co. v. Commission, [1978] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978), the Court applied the Commission's
description of unfair prices as those that are "excessive in relation to the economic value
of the product supplied.' Id at 299,21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 501. In addressing the issue
of price discrimination, the Court applied Article 86 to prohibit "applying dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage." Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 86(c).
When applying the United Brands test to the SWIFT-CEPT issue, the Commission
and/or the Court would probably compare the surcharge price formula CEPT offered
SWIFT with the flat monthly charge it extended to SITA. See notes 290-91 supra and
accompanying text. Also, "any attempt by the PTTs to impose a volume sensitive
surcharge on SITA (in order to remove the 'unequal treatment" onus) would no doubt be
equally stoutly contested on the grounds that there has been no change in the conditions
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maintain that its proposal had not violated any CCITT recommen-
dations and that the proposed rate structure was fair.295
It remains to be seen whether any investigation will take place.
In the meantime, the Commission will likely take a cautious
approach to controversies such as the CEPT-SWIFT dispute. The
EC's teleinformatics programmers should not ignore the issue. The
CEPT-SWIFT controversy is an example of how communications
rate schemes might distort competition and affect the development of
advanced teleinformatic services. Member States may, in the long
run, have more to lose than telex revenues if unfair rate schemes
continue to flourish; the private sector may lose the desire to exploit
the new technologies, thus thwarting the third general aim of the
EC's teleinformatics strategy.296
(2). Use Restrictions
A second area in which certain Member State PTTs could abuse
their dominant positions involves restrictions placed on the use of
international telecommunications lines. Such restrictions are partic-
ularly worrisome to undertakings in the data service industry. These
data service companies, which provide a variety of services to their
customers, including systems that pass massive amounts of data
between locations, rely heavily on the communications networks of
the various PTTs. The ability to provide services is a function of the
ease and cost of arranging communications systems with the PTTs.
To the extent that Member States put unfair restraints on the use of
the public communication systems, the data service provider may be
restrained in the manner in which it conducts its business..
Of particular interest to EC teleinformatics strategists are those
PTT use constraints that may have a negative impact on the estab-
lishment of data processing services within the EC. One commenta-
tor has suggested that new regulations promulgated by the Federal
Republic of Germany, providing that non-German data processors
or operations of SITA which would warrant such a change after 30 years of operating
under flat rate tariffs." TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, supra note 258, at 73.
295. TELEPHONY ARTICLE 2, supra note 258, at 73. The burden would be on the Com-
mission to establish that the agreement was unfair. One writer has suggested that the
Commission could compare CEPT's proposed rate scheme to what it might have devel-
oped if CEPT had adopted regulations similar to those of the FCC in the United States
concerning similar service offerings. Id at 70. This idea is interesting, but any such
study would be difficult to conduct. Given the numerous PITs involved, one might have
to formulate a European communications "shopping basket," and then compare the
arrived at indexed rate with the U.S. rates.
296. For a discussion of the third general aim of the EC strategy, see notes 135-71
supra and accompanying text. Overly restrictive rate schemes may keep out private serv-
ice providers and thus frustrate the EC strategy. See, eg., Study by M. Beesley, Dept. of
Industry (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Beesley Study].
1981]
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may not obtain access to the German market through an interna-
tional leased channel circuit unless that circuit terminates in either a
single terminal device or a German-based computer system, create
such constraints.297
Such restrictions on competition may come within the prohibi-
tions of Article 86 and thus serve to defeat the fundamental objective
of the Treaty, the creation of a common market.298 To come within
the prohibitions of Article 86, a dominant undertaking in one coun-
try need not be dominant throughout the EC.299 The main issue is
whether the abusive practice within one Member State affects trade
between Member States. The Commission probably has the author-
ity under Article 86 to investigate overly restrictive regulations
promulgated in a particular Member State.30°
d. State Aid Schemes
Articles 92-94 of the Treaty contain specific rules regarding aid
granted to undertakings by Member States.30' The Commission has
applied these rules on numerous occasions when approving national
aid schemes designed to support various sectors of the teleinformat-
ics industry.30 2 The relevance of the rules on state aid schemes to the
EC's overall teleinformatics strategy is demonstrated by the Com-
mission's growing concern over the proliferation of uncoordinated
national development programs in the new technologies area.303
The basic rule regarding Member State aid schemes is found in
Article 92(1), which provides that any aid granted by a Member
State that "distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar
297. See Markoski, supra note 54, at 317-19.
298. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 2, 86.
299. 2 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-256 to 258.
300. If the new regulations prove to unfairly restrict competition within the EC,
adversely affected companies would theoretically have standing to bring the matter
before Courts or informally, to the attention of the Commission. However, even before
complaints surface, the EC strategists may wish to consider taking measures to protect
against the proliferation of Member State regulations that appear to have as their intent
or effect the protection of national industries.
301. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 92-94. For the general Commission policy
concerning aid schemes for industries, see Eighth Report, 6-8 COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 122-23 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Eighth Competition Report].
302. See, e.g., Eighth Competition Report, supra note 301, at 144-45 (Commission's
conditional approval of United Kingdom's proposal to introduce an aid scheme promot-
ing research and development in the microelectronics field); Sixth Report, 6-8 COMMIS-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 122 (1977)
and Fifth Report, 5 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY, 120-21 (1976) (concerning German aid schemes); Sixth Report, supra, at
121 (concerning French aid schemes).
303. See generally Dublin Report, note 1 supra.
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as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the
common market."304 Article 92 also contains a list of aid schemes
which are, or may be considered by the Commission to be, compati-
ble with the common market.305 One excepted category includes aid
"to promote the execution of an important project of common Euro-
pean interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a
Member State.' 30 6 Such aid schemes need not have direct Commu-
nity-wide benefit, but must be projects in which all Member States
have a joint interest.30 7 Another category of aid schemes Article 92
explicitly endorses includes those schemes whose purpose is the
development of certain economic activities.30 8 The Commission has
used this provision to approve Member State aid for the develop-
ment of transportation, textile, shipbuilding, aircraft, film, and com-
puter industries. 3°9
The EC's desire to have some degree of coordination between
Member State development projects could be frustrated if states
decide to support nationally oriented teleinformatic industries. Arti-
cle 92 may provide EC authorities with the necessary "braking"
mechanisms, and future requests for exceptions from Article 92
prohibitions may be met with stricter Commission scrutiny than
before.
IV
PROPOSALS
The EC officials responsible for planning programs designed to
prepare Europe for the challenge of the new technologies are to be
commended for recognizing that Europe lags behind the others in
the teleinformatics field, and that immediate cooperation among the
Member States is needed if Europe is to catch up. The EC's three-
fold plan appears to be suited to the present European situation and
basically conforms to the objectives of the Treaty of Rome.
The most difficult problem facing the EC strategists will be the
creation of the sought-after "homogeneous market." As long as
304. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 92(1).
305. Id art. 92(3).
306. Treaty of Rome, mpra note 3, art. 92(3)(b).
307. See 3 Smrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-403. Nationally supported projects
become less defensible as the project's benefit or purpose vis-a-vis other Member States is
narrowed. For example, a German or British plan to fund advanced research on
advanced designs benefits the whole Community and is likely to be acceptable, whereas a
project to devise a uniquely "French" computer language for use only on French-made
software or hardware would not benefit other Member States, and hence be viewed as a
threat or distortion to competition.
308. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 92(3)(c).
309. 3 SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 199, at 3-405 to 409.
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national communications monopolies, in conjunction with associ-
ated equipment manufacturers and labor organizations, view an
integrated and truly competitive EC market as threatening to their
own interests, the prospect of having Europe develop its own
teleinformatic giants comparable to IBM, ITT, and Control Data
Corporation will remain dim. A competitive environment similar to
that of the United States does not currently exist in Europe, and the
Commission's initiatives to further such an environment have, thus
far, been modest. The EC's hesitation in this area is no doubt a
function of political realities. Even in light of such realities, this
Article suggests that the EC has not begun to exhaust its potential
authority under the Treaty.
This Article presents five suggestions on how the EC can begin
to more fully utilize its authority in the teleinformatics field. First,
the EC should continue its efforts to develop a modem technologi-
cally integrated telecommunications infrastructure similar to that
found in the United States, allowing for complete and open network
interconnection between the Member States.
Second, the EC should take affirmative steps to assure that
Member States remove restrictions on the use of and the type of
equipment that may be used to obtain access to public communica-
tions systems. PTT restrictions aimed at keeping private enterprises
out of what they consider to be "their market" will not foster EC
objectives. Such practices fragment the EC market, offer little devel-
opment incentive to emerging European enterprises and, ironically,
favor the continued dominance of non-European controlled giants
which are generally able to avoid the fall-out of short-sighted protec-
tionist policies.
Third, EC authorities should promote the harmonization of
divergent Member State mechanisms for setting communication
rates. 310 Because harmonized rate structures could assist in the crea-
tion of an open and competitive teleinformatics market, EC institu-
tions should not hesitate to enter this field. Rather than a campaign
to break up national monopolies, what is called for in this area is
greater EC involvement with national authorities to "encourage"
more rational and uniform rate structures.311
310. This suggestion touches upon politically sensitive issues, such as the manner in
which Member States cross-subsidize post office revenues with those of the phone com-
panies. Recent British and Swedish efforts to separate the post offices from the phone
companies indicate a more enlightened approach, and hopefully portray a sign of things
to come.
311. The EC could, for example, encourage rates based upon the cost of capitalizing
communication networks, not the post office; and the cost of building communications
networks, not the value of the service to the consumer.
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Fourth, the EC should begin immediate inquiries concerning
the ultimate role of telecommunications monopolies. For example,
the EC should question whether allowing PTTs total unregulated
entry into all sectors of the teleinformatics market serves EC objec-
tives. The increased revenues flowing into the PTTs as a result of the
development of publicly owned switching or information networks
available to telephone customers must be balanced against any nega-
tive impact that such initiatives might have on private enterprises
competing for the same market.3 12
Finally, EC recommendations regarding the elimination of
restrictive public procurement and type approval practices must be
strengthened. In their current state, they offer little incentive for
Member State reform. If the situation does not begin to change by
the mid-1980's, as hoped by the Commission, the EC should employ
more powerful weapons, such as regulations or directives, to prohibit
such practices.
CONCLUSION
The programs proposed thus far reflect a positive EC commit-
ment to create new markets and strengthen corresponding industrial
capacity. The EC strategists have taken a balanced approach con-
cerning the protection of individual privacy, demonstrated by
proposals that reflect the endorsement of privacy protection laws
without hindering homogeneous economic development. Further-
more, the programs underscore an EC commitment to utilize the
new technologies for the betterment of society and to prevent mas-
sive unemployment upon the arrival of the information era.
Whether Europe will be able to effectively catch up to the United
States and Japan by the 1990's in the manufacture of high-technol-
ogy products will depend on many factors including resources from
both the private and public sectors for research and development
and coordination among Member States with respect to ongoing
national research and development projects. The EC has a responsi-
bility to see to it that the factors merge in an environment that stimu-
lates, rather than inhibits, competition within the private sector.
312. See, ag., Beesley Study, note 296 supra.
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